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RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
THE TEMPORARILY UNAVAILABLE JUROR 
AND NEW YORK’S MANDATORY 24-HOUR 
LIMIT ON THE SEPARATION OF JURORS 
DURING DELIBERATIONS 
MICHAEL PASINKOFF† 
INTRODUCTION 
Isolating deliberating trial jurors from contact with the 
outside world has been a feature of the American criminal justice 
system since the founding of the country.  At common law, “[t]his 
generally meant no going home at night, no lunch breaks, no 
dispersing at all until they reached a verdict.”1  Commonly 
referred to as jury sequestration,2 every state has at some point 
mandated it as a necessary tool to ensure the integrity of a 
criminal jury trial.3  Over the years, however, a wide spectrum of 
views has developed regarding the usefulness of this procedure.  
Some states forbid sequestration absent exceptional 
circumstances.4  Other states mandate it in every trial when a 
jury begins to deliberate.5  New York State has a unique 
approach.  While jury sequestration is no longer mandated, a 
deliberating jury in New York must return to court to continue 
its deliberations on the next day the court is open for business.  If 
all deliberating jurors do not return the next day, even if due to 
the most extreme personal emergency, the law arguably 
mandates a mistrial if the defendant does not consent to a longer 
 
† Assistant District Attorney, Violent Criminal Enterprises Unit, New York 
County District Attorney’s Office. J.D., Brooklyn Law School; B.A., New York 
University. The author gratefully acknowledges Harriett Galvin and Anne LeCard 
for their assistance. The views reflected in this article are solely those of the author 
and not those of the New York County District Attorney’s Office. 
1 Dietz v. Bouldin, __U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2016). 
2 Sequestration as it relates to juries is defined as a “custodial isolation of a trial 
jury to prevent tampering and exposure to publicity . . . .” Sequestration, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
3 See infra Part V. 
4 See infra Part V. 
5 See infra Part V. 
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recess.6  As illustrated by the hypothetical below, the remedy of 
an automatic mistrial in this circumstance does nothing to 
protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury;7 nor does it ensure that the trial is a fair one. 
I. A HYPOTHETICAL “24-HOUR RULE” VIOLATION 
A grand jury in New York County (Manhattan) returned an 
indictment, charging John Smith with Murder in the Second 
Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 125.25(1), and two 
counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, 
in violation of New York Penal Law § 265.03.  At the trial, which 
lasted more than two months, the prosecution called over sixty 
witnesses and presented over 100 exhibits.  At least two essential 
witnesses had moved to other states and had to be flown back to 
New York at the prosecution’s expense.8  Several witnesses were 
reluctant to testify, fearing for their safety and the safety of their 
families.  In fact, due to safety concerns, at least one witness had 
to be relocated after testifying. 
Given the anticipated length of the trial, it took over one 
week to select a jury of twelve individuals who could not only be 
fair and impartial but who could also devote two months to the 
trial.9  The expected length of the trial also led the trial judge to 
direct the selection of four alternate jurors.10  Many potential 
jurors had legitimate commitments that kept them from serving 
on a jury for a two-month trial; the jurors who were selected, 
although inconvenienced by the significant length of the trial, 
made the necessary adjustments to their schedules, consistent 
with the obligations of jury service.11  One potential juror, who 
 
6 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 280.10; 310.10(2) (McKinney 2018). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) 
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to 
provide the right to trial by jury for serious offenses); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 
(guaranteeing the right to trial by jury). 
8 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 640.10(3) (providing the procedure for issuing 
subpoenas to out-of-state witnesses). 
9 New York mandates that “every trial of an indictment must be a jury trial” 
consisting of twelve jurors. Id. §§ 260.10; 270.05(1). A trial jury of an information 
charging a misdemeanor in a local criminal court consists of six jurors. 
Id. § 360.10(1). 
10 The law also permits, but does not require, the selection of up to six alternate 
jurors in a trial of an indictment, id. § 270.30(1), and up to two alternates in a trial 
of a misdemeanor in a local criminal court. Id. § 360.35(1). The exact number of 
alternates selected, if any, is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge. 
11 Mere inconvenience is an insufficient basis for excusing a person from jury 
service. See People v. Wilson, 52 A.D.3d 941, 942, 859 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (3d Dep’t 
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was ultimately selected, informed the court that he had a 
weekend trip to Seattle planned, which could not be rescheduled.  
However, because he was scheduled to leave Friday evening and 
return Sunday night, the juror’s travel plans did not pose any 
impediment to jury service. 
Although the trial judge was diligent in ensuring that the 
trial progressed expeditiously, there were several interruptions, 
including one day each week for the judge to deal with the 
approximately 200 other cases on his calendar.12  In addition, the 
trial was not in session on one day because a juror had a medical 
procedure and on another day for a religious holiday observed by 
several of the jurors.13  Although the law leaves to the trial 
court’s discretion the length and number of recesses,14 the judge 
presiding at Smith’s trial, mindful of the need to keep the case on 
schedule, granted recesses infrequently and only for exceptional 
circumstances.  When the court did grant recesses, or when the 
business for the day had concluded, the court “permit[ted the  
 
 
 
2008) (“Slight interference with employment or inconvenience related to sitting on a 
jury are insufficient grounds to support a challenge for cause.”). If a juror, despite 
financial loss or other personal inconvenience, gives assurance that he or she can be 
fair and impartial, a court cannot grant a challenge for cause based on such factors. 
See, e.g., People v. Butler, 281 A.D.2d 333, 333, 722 N.Y.S.2d 510, 510 (1st Dep’t 
2001) (“The court properly declined to discharge a sworn juror when, prior to the 
completion of jury selection, the juror expressed concern and bitterness about the 
time and money he was losing.”). However, when jury service “would cause undue 
hardship or extreme inconvenience to [a potential juror], a person under his or her 
care or supervision, or the public,” a potential juror can be excused from service. See 
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 517(c) (McKinney 2018); People v. Mulinar, 185 A.D.2d 996, 998, 
587 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (2d Dep’t 1992) (court properly discharged “five of the seven 
prospective jurors . . . due to physical impairments, family obligations, or work 
commitments”). 
12 There are approximately thirty trial judges who sit in New York County 
Supreme Court, the trial-level court for felony cases. Twenty of these judges have a 
designated calendar day. See Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Term Schedule, Term 
9, NYCOURTS.GOV, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/criminal/termschedule.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
13 Christmas is the only religious holiday officially recognized by the New York 
State Court System. See Future Court Terms & Holidays, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/admin/holidayschedule.shtml (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
14 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.45 (allowing a court to permit a jury to 
separate during “pre-deliberation” recesses without specifying a time limit on the 
length of any such recess); see also People v. Diggins, 11 N.Y.3d 518, 524, 900 N.E.2d 
959, 962–63, 872 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411–12 (2008) (“[t]he granting of an adjournment for 
any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court”) 
(quoting Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 283, 471 N.E.2d 447, 454, 481 
N.Y.S.2d 675, 682 (1984)). 
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jury] to separate,”15 to return to their respective homes, and come 
back on the next scheduled trial date.  That was usually, but not 
always, the next day the courthouse was open for business. 
At the close of the two-month evidentiary portion of the trial, 
the defense and prosecution delivered their final arguments, 
which took a total of two days.16  The jury was then given 
extensive legal instructions before retiring to deliberate on a 
Friday.17  As required by New York Criminal Procedure Law 
(“CPL”) § 310.10(1), the jury was taken to a conference room 
immediately outside of the courtroom to conduct its deliberations, 
where they were “continuously kept together under the 
supervision of a court officer or court officers.”18  The court 
officers, “[e]xcept when so authorized by the court or when 
performing administerial duties with respect to the 
jurors, . . . [did] not speak to or communicate with them or permit 
any other person to do so.”19  The supervising court officers at 
Smith’s trial also took custody of each juror’s cellular telephone.  
If the jurors needed any physical or testimonial evidence, or had 
legal questions, they communicated their requests in notes, 
signed by the foreperson, which were given to a supervising court 
officer and delivered to the judge.20  The jury was then returned  
 
 
 
15 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.45. 
16 Id. §§ 260.30(8), (9). 
17 Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets forth the requirements for a 
judge’s charge to the jury. Id. § 300.10. Further, CPL § 300.10(5), provides that 
“[b]oth before and after the court’s charge, the parties may submit requests to 
charge, either orally or in writing, and the court must rule promptly upon each 
request.” Id. § 300.10(5). This is typically done at a “charge conference” held before 
the court instructs the jury. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 26 N.Y.3d 170, 172, 42 
N.E.3d 688, 690, 21 N.Y.S.3d 191, 193 (2015) (“At the charge conference, Supreme 
Court indicated that it would, at defendant's request, give a charge on the 
justification defense.”). 
18 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(1). 
19 Id. 
20 A jury may “request the court for further instruction or information with 
respect to the law, with respect to the content or substance of any trial evidence, or 
with respect to any other matter pertinent to the jury’s consideration of the case.” 
Id. § 310.30. While the statute does not mandate that the request be in writing, the 
practice in New York State is that a request be made in the form of a note. See 
People v. O’Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 277–278, 579 N.E.2d 189, 192, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 
162 (1991); Exhibits, Readback & Law Questions, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Exhibits_Readback_Law.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2018) (instructing jurors to transmit requests via a note signed 
by the foreperson). 
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to the courtroom and the trial judge, in the presence of the 
parties, responded to the jury’s inquiry.  No other contact with 
the jury during deliberations was permitted. 
Until 1995, New York law required juries to be sequestered 
from the time they began deliberations until they reached a 
verdict.21  If no verdict was reached before the end of a court day, 
jurors were taken to hotels and returned to court the next 
morning to continue their deliberations.  In 1995, the mandatory 
sequestration rule was relaxed with the enactment of CPL § 
310.10(2).22  The initial version of CPL § 310.10(2) did not apply 
to the most serious cases, including murder and other violent 
felonies.23  That section, which was subsequently amended in 
2001 to apply to all cases, provides, in relevant part: 
At any time after the jury has been charged or commenced its 
deliberations, and after notice to the parties and affording such 
parties an opportunity to be heard on the record outside of the 
presence of the jury, the court may declare the deliberations to 
be in recess and may thereupon direct the jury to suspend its 
deliberations and to separate for a reasonable period of time to 
be specified by the court, not to exceed twenty-four hours, 
except that in the case of a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, such 
separation may extend beyond such twenty-four hour period.  
Before each recess, the court must admonish the jury as 
provided in § 270.40 of this chapter and direct it not to resume 
its deliberations until all twelve jurors have reassembled in the 
designated place at the termination of the declared recess.24   
 
21 1970 N.Y. Laws 2281 (enacted as N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10). 
22 Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 83, 1995 N.Y. Laws 111–12. 
23 Id. The 1995 version of Criminal Procedure Law § 310.10(2) did not apply to 
an indictment charging a “class A felony or a class B violent felony offense or class C 
violent felony.” Class A felonies include: Murder in the First Degree, N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2018); Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.25; Aggravated Murder, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.26; Arson in the First 
Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.20; Kidnapping in the First Degree, N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 135.25 and certain serious drug offenses, such as Criminal Sale of a 
Controlled Substance in the First Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.43. For a list of 
class B and C violent felonies, which include various degrees of assault, robbery and 
burglary, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(1). 
24 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(2). This statutory provision is a limited 
exception to the mandatory sequestration provision of CPL § 310.10(1), which is still 
in effect. Under CPL § 310.10(1), a jury, once deliberations begin, must, “except as 
otherwise provided in [CPL § 310.10(2)] be continuously kept together under the 
supervision of a court officer or court officers.” During each of the recesses, the trial 
court is required to give to the jury certain instructions designed to ensure that it 
does not resume deliberations until all twelve jurors are back in the jury room, and 
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According to its plain language, the statute permits a 
separation for “up to twenty-four hours,” but court holidays and 
weekends are not counted in this time.  Thus, if jury 
deliberations are declared in recess at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday, the 
statute requires that the court direct jurors to return to 
deliberate on Monday before 5:00 p.m.  If jury deliberations are 
declared in recess at the close of business on a Thursday at 5:00 
p.m., the statute requires that the court direct jurors to return to 
deliberate on Friday before 5:00 p.m.  In practice, jurors are 
directed to return to court the following day at 9:30 a.m. to 
resume deliberations.  The statute, however, is technically 
satisfied if deliberations resume, even for just a few moments, 
within the 24-hour period.  In other words, deliberations of any 
length serve to “reset” the 24-hour clock. 
The statute does not control until the jury begins 
deliberations, even if all the evidence has been submitted, the 
parties have delivered summations, and the court has given 
most, but not all, of its final instructions.  Until deliberations 
have begun, recesses are controlled by CPL § 270.45, which 
grants the judge unfettered discretion and sets no time limit.25  
Thus, a trial judge who is otherwise prepared to charge a jury on 
a Monday morning, but who anticipates juror unavailability on 
Tuesday, can delay the charge and the start of deliberations until 
Wednesday morning—after the potential scheduling issue has 
passed. 
The statute also does not control after the jury has informed 
the court that it has reached a verdict.26  Thus, in the rare 
circumstance when a juror becomes ill after the verdict is 
reached, but before it is formally announced in court, there is no 
requirement that the juror return to court or that the verdict be 
announced within the time period set forth in CPL § 310.10(2). 
Accordingly, at Smith’s trial, as the close of business drew 
near on Friday without a verdict, the trial judge, “after notice to 
the parties, and affording such parties an opportunity to be heard 
on the record outside of the presence of the jury,”27 instructed the 
 
that it is not improperly exposed to any information about the case that was not 
presented in court. Id. §§ 310.10(2); 270.40. 
25 See supra note 14. 
26 See People v. Monroig, 223 A.D.2d 730, 731, 637 N.Y.S.2d 451, 451 (2d Dep’t 
1996) (finding no abuse of discretion in declining to sequester jury after verdict was 
reached, but before it could be fully read into the record, because of the sudden 
illness of a juror). 
27 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.10(2). 
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court officers to tell the jurors to cease deliberations and return 
to the courtroom.  When all jurors were present, the court 
instructed them not to discuss the case until they were all 
present in the jury room on Monday.  The court also admonished 
the jury not to speak with “anyone else upon any subject 
connected with the trial; [not to] read or listen to any 
accounts . . . of the case reported by newspapers or other news 
media; [and not to] visit or view the premises or place where the 
offense [was] allegedly committed . . . .”28  The court reminded the 
jury not to do any internet research on the case, and to “promptly 
report . . . any incident within their knowledge involving an 
attempt by any person improperly to influence any member of 
the jury.”29  This was the same admonition that the trial judge 
gave before each recess—an instruction that the law presumes 
the jurors will follow.30  The jury was then dismissed from the 
courtroom with instructions to return on Monday. 
Eleven of the deliberating jurors returned on Monday as 
instructed.  The twelfth juror informed the court by telephone 
that his return flight to New York City from Seattle was delayed 
until late that evening, and consequently, he would not be able to 
return to court until Tuesday morning.  Although there were 
several alternate jurors available, Smith would not consent to a 
substitution.31  Since deliberations would not resume until the 
next day, the recess would be more than the statutorily 
authorized period permitted by CPL § 310.10(2).  The court asked 
the juror to see if any other flights were available that would 
facilitate an earlier return.  After all, if the juror returned to 
court at any time before 5:00 p.m., deliberations could resume, 
even for just a few moments, and the statutory mandate would be 
satisfied.  The juror informed the court that no earlier flights 
were available. 
 
 
 
28 Id. CPL § 310.10(2) requires that these instructions, codified in CPL § 270.40, 
be given prior to any time that a deliberating jury is allowed to separate. See, e.g., 
Jury Separation During Deliberations, NYCOURTS.GOV, http://www.nycourts.gov/ 
judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Jury_Separation_Rev.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2018). 
29 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.40. 
30 See People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266, 273–74, 926 N.E.2d 240, 245, 899 
N.Y.S.2d 733, 738 (2010). 
31 CPL § 270.35(1) requires a defendant to consent, in writing, to substitution of 
a sworn juror with an alternate juror after deliberations have begun. 
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Smith’s attorney was obviously aware of this juror’s travel 
plans because the juror had relayed this information to the court 
during jury selection.32  Nonetheless, although Smith’s attorney 
was unable to articulate any prejudice that his client would 
suffer from the brief delay in resuming deliberations, he moved 
for a mistrial, which the court granted with great reluctance.  
Unlike other time limitations specified in the Criminal Procedure 
Law, which may be extended “for good cause shown,” CPL § 
310.10(2) on its face affords judges no discretion to extend a 
recess in deliberations beyond the period specified in the 
statute.33  In considering Smith’s application, the court was 
mindful of its obligation to construe laws “so as to give effect to 
the plain meaning of the words used [by the Legislature].”34  
Without any controlling appellate authority granting trial judges 
authority to extend recesses beyond the period specified in CPL § 
310.10(2), and cognizant of the fact that this statute was a 
relatively recent and limited exception to the long tradition of 
mandatory sequestration of criminal trial jurors in New York, 
the trial court concluded that a recess beyond the statutorily 
authorized period would be contrary to the legislative intent. 
Given the plain language of CPL § 310.10(2), defendants 
argue that judges have no discretion to react to unexpected, yet 
temporary, instances of juror unavailability.  They contend that 
the statute mandates a mistrial when deliberations do not 
resume on the next day the court is open for business.  These 
applications are sometimes granted even when defendants have 
suffered no prejudice from the delay in resuming deliberations.  
And since a mistrial granted at the defendant’s request is not 
subject to appellate review, prosecutors have no remedy.35 
 
32 See supra text following note 11. 
33 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80(3) (authorizing, for good cause, 
extension of the time after which an incarcerated defendant must be indicted before 
being released from custody); id. § 700.70 (providing that notice of an eavesdropping 
investigation must be served within fifteen days after arraignment unless good 
cause shown); id. § 710.30(2) (requiring prosecution to serve within fifteen days after 
arraignment notice of any statements made by defendant which prosecution seeks to 
offer on direct case—a period which can be extended by the court for good cause 
shown); id. § 250.10(2) (notice of psychiatric defense must be served within thirty 
days of arraignment, although court can extend the time for good cause shown). 
34 Myers v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d 1, 12, 85 N.E.3d 57, 61, 62 N.Y.S.3d 838, 
842 (2017) (quoting People v. Finnegan, 85 N.Y.2d 53, 58, 647 N.E.2d 758, 760, 623 
N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (1995)). 
35 The prosecution’s right to appeal is governed by statute and only those orders 
listed in CPL § 450.20 may be appealed by the prosecution. These include orders 
dismissing an accusatory instrument, setting aside a verdict, or granting a motion to 
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When courts grant mistrials under these circumstances, the 
state is put through the expense and burden of retrying an entire 
case even when there is no suggestion that the original trial was 
anything but fair.  The mischief caused by this statute is not 
confined to unnecessary mistrials.  The statutory mandate has 
other consequences, such as assigning temporary judges to cover 
a trial judge’s calendar day, scheduling jury deliberations during 
a calendar day (when responding to jury notes can be difficult 
and time consuming),36 and ordering jurors to appear in court 
even when they have a serious personal emergency.37 
Various bills have been proposed, but never enacted, to give 
New York trial judges express statutory discretion to suspend 
jury deliberations for a period longer than that currently 
permitted by CPL § 310.10(2).38  Nonetheless, based upon earlier 
 
suppress evidence that renders the remaining evidence insufficient to sustain the 
prosecution’s burden of proof. An improperly granted mistrial is not one of the 
statutorily authorized grounds for an appeal by the prosecution. Further, it is 
unlikely that a writ of prohibition, brought pursuant to Article 78 of the New York 
Civil Practice Law and Rules, would be a viable method by which the prosecution 
could challenge a mistrial granted for an alleged violation of CPL § 310.10(2). See 
Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 569, 523 N.E.2d 297, 300, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24 
(1988) (“Because of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where 
there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court—in cases where judicial 
authority is challenged—acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in 
excess of its authorized power.”). By contrast, Article 78 relief is available to a 
defendant who claims that a mistrial was declared without manifest necessity and 
that a second trial is barred on double jeopardy grounds. See, e.g., In re Capellan v. 
Stone, 49 A.D.3d 121, 124–25, 849 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532–33 (1st Dep’t 2008). 
36 There may well be times where, given the posture of jury deliberations, a trial 
court, in its discretion may think it prudent that the jury continue deliberating 
through a calendar day. However, this decision should be entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
37 The trial court would also have to make an inquiry to determine whether the 
personal emergency rendered the juror grossly unqualified to continuing serving. 
See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 227 A.D.2d 162, 162, 642 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634 (1st Dep’t 
1996) (trial court properly discharged juror suffering from stomach flu since the 
juror stated that the illness “might . . . affect[] his ability to concentrate and 
deliberate”). 
38 In 2012, the New York State Senate introduced a bill authorizing the 
suspension of jury deliberations “upon good cause shown” for up to 72 hours. N.Y. 
State Senate, S06679, 199 Legislative Session (N.Y. 2012). The bill was not approved 
by the Senate. In 2016, a similar bill was introduced but again was not approved by 
the Legislature. See N.Y. State Assembly, A07031, 201 Legislative Session (N.Y. 
2016) (permitting suspension of jury deliberations until close of business the next 
day or, for good cause shown, beyond close of business on the third day following 
recess of jury deliberations unless both parties consent to a longer period). Finally, 
in 2017, a third attempt was made to amend the law.  The Legislature has yet to 
adopt this amendment. See N.Y. State Assembly, A07448, 201 Legislative Session 
(N.Y. 2017) (permitting suspension of jury deliberations until the close of business 
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versions of New York’s sequestration rule and case law 
interpreting those provisions, this Article contends that CPL § 
310.10(2) is not violated when deliberations do not resume within 
the prescribed statutory period due to an unexpected delay 
occasioned by a juror’s temporary inability to return to court.  
Rather, a violation occurs only when, in the absence of such a 
circumstance, a court orders a recess in deliberations, over the 
timely objection of the defense, and directs the jury to return on a 
day other than the next day that court is open for business.  
Further, even when there is an alleged violation of the statute, a 
defendant should still be required to show how he was prejudiced 
by the delay in resuming deliberations before a mistrial is 
granted. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the law 
regarding judicial control over jurors, both before and after 
deliberations begin.  Part III discusses the historical origins of 
jury sequestration and the path to the enactment of the current 
version of CPL § 310.10(2).  Part IV discusses case law relevant 
to CPL § 310.10(2).  Part V surveys the law in the other forty-
nine states, none of which has a per se reversal rule in cases 
where a deliberating jury is separated out of necessity.  Part VI 
recommends an amendment to the statute that would permit 
recesses in jury deliberations for as long as is necessary to 
accommodate the temporary unavailability of a deliberating juror 
or to address an unforeseen circumstance that makes it 
impractical for deliberations to resume.  The proposed 
amendment would also permit deliberations to be adjourned for 
up to 48 hours in non-emergency situations to afford judges the 
ability to deal with non-trial matters at least one day per week. 
II. JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER JURORS 
Under New York law, a trial judge has a sliding scale of 
discretion, from jury selection to jury discharge.  A judge’s 
discretion is at its greatest during jury selection, when he or she 
may excuse potential jurors for cause.39  A court may grant either 
 
on the next business day or “for good cause shown, beyond close of business on the 
third day following recess of jury deliberations”). For the complete text of all of these 
proposed amendments, see http://nyassembly.gov/leg (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
39 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 2018). When jurors express a 
doubt about their own impartiality, “[j]udges should either elicit some unequivocal 
assurance of their ability to be impartial when that is appropriate, or excuse the 
juror when that is appropriate, since, in most cases, the worst the court will have 
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side’s challenge for cause and dismiss a prospective juror when 
the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from 
rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced 
at the trial.”40  There is no need, if the prosecution is making the 
challenge, for the defendant to consent before the prospective 
juror is excused.41  There is also no statutory restriction on the 
length of the jury selection process, or on any recesses taken 
during the process.42 
The standard for removal of a sworn juror and replacement 
with an alternate juror is more onerous.43  CPL § 270.35 
authorizes the trial court to replace a sworn juror with an 
alternate juror if the sworn juror “is unable to continue serving 
by reason of illness or other incapacity, . . . or the court finds, 
from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that 
[the juror] is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . .”44  Prior 
 
done . . . is to have replaced one impartial juror with another impartial juror.” 
People v. Harris, 19 N.Y.3d 679, 685, 978 N.E.2d 1246, 1250, 954 N.Y.S.2d 777, 780 
(2012) (internal citations omitted). 
40 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(b); see also People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 
600, 611, 730 N.E.2d 932, 938, 709 N.Y.S.2d 134, 140 (2000). In addition, depending 
on the level of offense, the law affords each party a certain number of “peremptory 
challenges,” which can be used to strike a potential juror without a showing that the 
juror cannot be fair and impartial. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25. An erroneous 
ruling granting a challenge for cause by the People is not reversible error “unless the 
people have exhausted their peremptory challenges at the time or exhaust them 
before the selection of the jury is complete.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(2). 
Similarly, an “erroneous ruling by the court denying a challenge for cause by the 
defendant does not constitute reversible error unless the defendant has exhausted 
his peremptory challenges at the time or . . . before the selection of the jury is 
complete.” Id. 
41 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(2); see also People v. Smith, 136 A.D.3d 532, 
533, 25 N.Y.S.2d 178, 178 (1st Dep’t 2012) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the court 
improperly granted “two challenges for cause by the People”). 
42 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15; see also People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744, 
745, 551 N.E.2d 90, 91, 551 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (1989) (finding a fifteen-minute time 
limit on each attorney’s voir dire in the first two rounds and a ten-minute limit for 
the third round to be an appropriate exercise of discretion). But see, e.g., People v. 
Steward, 17 N.Y.3d 104, 107, 950 N.E.2d 480, 482, 926 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (2011) 
(finding that a “five minute limitation on counsel for the questioning of jurors . . . in 
this multiple felony case” was an abuse of discretion). 
43 See People v. Henderson, 74 A.D.3d 1567, 1570, 903 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593 (3d 
Dep’t 2010) (“This exacting test, which requires a greater showing than a for-cause 
challenge, may not be based upon speculation as to a juror's possible partiality 
premised upon equivocal responses.”) (internal citations omitted). 
44 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1). See People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 299, 
506 N.E.2d 901, 906, 514 N.Y.S.2d 191, 196 (1987) (holding that, when a trial court 
learns that a juror may have become grossly unqualified, the court is obligated to 
make a “probing and tactful inquiry” of the juror, and must put the reasons for its 
ruling on the record). 
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to discharging a sworn juror based on unavailability, the trial 
judge is required to “make a reasonably thorough inquiry . . . .”45  
Trial courts are further authorized to presume a juror 
unavailable for continued service if “there is no reasonable 
likelihood such juror will be appearing[] in court within two 
hours of the time set by the court for the trial to resume.”46  If the 
juror is discharged prior to deliberations, the defendant’s consent 
is not required for the trial court to discharge and replace the 
juror with an alternate juror.47 
A trial judge is vested with almost unfettered discretion to 
adjourn the trial and “permit separation of the jurors . . . at any 
stage of the trial up until submission of the case to the jury.”48  
CPL § 270.45 authorizes the trial court to permit a jury to 
“separate during recesses and adjournments.”49  Although 
lengthy mid-trial adjournments are generally undesirable, there 
is no limitation on the number or length of adjournments that a 
judge can authorize during the pendency of a trial.50 
Once the jury begins to deliberate, a trial judge’s discretion 
with respect to replacement of sworn jurors with alternate jurors 
and adjournments of deliberations all but disappears.  First, 
while a trial judge can discharge a deliberating juror without the 
consent of the defendant, an alternate juror cannot replace the 
discharged juror unless the defendant signs a waiver, in open 
court, consenting to the substitution.51  If the defendant neither 
consents to the substitution, nor consents to an eleven-person 
jury, the court must declare a mistrial.52  Further, as noted 
above, any adjournments of the trial after deliberations 
commence are subject to the restriction of CPL § 310.10(2).53 
 
45 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(2)(a). 
46 Id. 
47 See id. 
48 People v. D’Alvia, 171 A.D.2d 96, 103, 575 N.Y.S. 495, 500 (2d Dep’t 1991). 
49 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.45. 
50 See People v. Molinas, 21 A.D.2d 384, 385–86, 250 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (1st 
Dep’t 1964) (finding that a “five week adjournment of trial necessitated by illness of 
the trial judge was not grounds for a mistrial”); People v. Cooper, 173 A.D.2d 551, 
552, 570 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (2d Dep’t 1991) (holding that the trial court properly 
declined to declare a mistrial based upon a six-week interruption of the trial when 
the defense counsel fell ill). 
51 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1). Such consent “must be in writing and must 
be signed by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court.” Id.; 
see People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 443–44, 880 N.E.2d 863, 866, 850 N.Y.S.2d 
377, 380 (2007). 
52 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.35(1). 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 22–24. 
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III. HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF JURY 
SEQUESTRATION IN NEW YORK 
Historically, sequestration not only meant isolating jurors 
from the outside world; it also included keeping them “without 
meat, drink, fire, or candle . . . till they are all unanimously 
agreed.”54  This was done not to ensure jurors’ impartiality, but to 
compel them to reach a verdict.  In the time of Edward I, King of 
England from 1272 to 1307, the “sheriff could cause the jurors in 
an assize to be kept sine cibo et potu until they agreed.”55  Judges 
at the time also had the option to “afforce the jury,” namely by 
“adding jurors to the majority until twelve were found to be 
unanimous.”56  When afforcing juries became obsolete in the time 
of Edward III, “lock[ing] up the jury in a room, without meat, 
drink, or fire, or candle” became one of the most powerful 
methods to compel a unanimous verdict.57 
 
54 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375–76 
(15th Edition 1809). There are other historical instances, apart from a jury trial, 
where isolation has been used to compel and accelerate agreement. The most well-
known example is the isolation of cardinals during the election of a new pope. This 
practice was instituted in 1274 when Pope Gregory X called a “general council of the 
Church . . . .” MICHAEL WALSH, THE CONCLAVE: A SOMETIMES SECRET AND 
OCCASIONALLY BLOODY HISTORY OF PAPAL ELECTIONS 85 (2003). The council issued 
various decrees which mandated certain procedures to be followed by the cardinals 
who were charged with the selection of a new pope. Id. Much like sequestration of a 
jury, cardinals called to elect a pope were required, during the election process, to 
“live in common in one room, with no partition or curtain.” Id. Until a new pope was 
elected, the cardinals were locked into one room, no person was allowed to speak 
with them and “[i]f, after three days, there has been no election, they are allowed 
only one dish at lunch and supper, then after five days only bread, wine, and water 
are to be given [to] them until they come up with a pope.” Id. 
 Another historical instance was the election of the Roman Emperor in the 1300s. 
In 1356, Charles IV of Germany published the “Golden Bull of Charles IV” which 
outlined the election process. SIR ROBERT COMYN, CHARLES IV OF GERMANY 
PUBLISHES HIS GOLDEN BULL reprinted in 7 THE GREAT EVENTS BY FAMOUS 
HISTORIANS 160 (Rossiter Johnson, ed. 1905). The process required that upon the 
death of the emperor, seven electors were to be summoned to Frankfort. Id. Further, 
the electors were forbidden from leaving the city before an emperor was elected. Id. 
If the electors after thirty days had still not elected a new emperor, their diets would 
be restricted to only bread and water. Id. at 161. 
55 JOHN PROFATT, TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 77, at 113 (1877). Sine cibo et 
potu is translated as “without food or water”; assize is defined as “[a] session of a 
court or council; [or] a meeting of a court presided over by a judge or judges who 
travel periodically from town to town.” Assize, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
56 PROFATT, supra note 55, § 77, at 113. 
57 Id. § 77, at 113 n.4. 
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These practices were employed with little concern that a 
defendant receive a fair trial, or that the jury remain impartial.58  
Jurors would almost always convict a person, especially in cases 
involving high treason or crimes against the state, regardless of 
the actual evidence presented at trial.59  It was widely known 
that “the royal will or wish” for a specific verdict was “without 
opposition carried into effect [by a jury].”60  Indeed, “to be accused 
of a crime against the state and to be convicted were almost the 
same thing”61 and jurors were fearful of imprisonment should 
they return a verdict of not guilty.  Convictions were quick and 
almost guaranteed.62  For example, during the trial of John 
Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, for High Treason, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty.  Yet they did so “onely [sic] for safety of their 
goods and lives, which they were well assured to lose, in case 
they had acquitted him.”63 
Up until the late 1600s, jurors could be legally punished or 
imprisoned by the presiding judge for returning a verdict that the 
court found improper.  In the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton 
for High Treason, after the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, 
“the court being dissatisfied with the [v]erdict, committed the 
[j]ury to prison.”64  Similarly, in 1670, William Penn and William 
Mead were indicted for “tumultuous assembly.”65  The indictment 
charged that the two men, “with force and arms, in the parish of 
St. Bennet Grace-church in Bridge-ward, London, in the street 
called Grace-church street, unlawfully and tumultuously did 
assemble and congregate themselves together, to the disturbance 
of the peace of the said lord the king.”66 
 
 
58 Id. § 77, at 114. 
59 Id. § 35, at 52. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. § 36, at 53. 
62 During the Trial of Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, the jury “went together” 
and “[w]ithin one hour after, . . . the noblemen of the [j]ury came every one back” 
and returned a verdict of guilty. Trial of Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, 1 
HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 1258 (1816). In the trial of Sir Thomas More for treason, 
the jury withdrew from the courtroom and returned fifteen minutes later with a 
guilty verdict. Trial of Sir Thomas More for High Treason, 1 HOWELL’S STATE 
TRIALS 392 (1816). 
63 Trial of John Fisher, 1 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 402 (1816). 
64 Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 900 (1816). 
65 Trial of William Penn and William Mead, 6 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 952 
(1670). 
66 Id. at 955. 
2018] NEW YORK’S 24-HOUR JURY DELIBERATION RULE 201 
After the trial was completed, “[t]he [j]ury were commanded 
up to agree upon their verdict . . . . After an hour and a half’s 
time eight [jurors] came down agreed, but four remained above,” 
apparently unwilling to convict Mead or Penn.67  The court then 
“used many unworthy threats to the four that dissented,” and 
told the foreperson, “you are the cause of this disturbance and 
manifestly shew yourself an abettor of faction; I shall set a mark 
upon you.”68  The jury, after listening to this “menacing 
language,” was sent to “consider of bringing in their verdict, and 
after some considerable time they returned to the Court.”69  
While the jury found the two “[g]uilty of speaking in Grace-
church street,”70 they would not return a verdict of guilty for the 
actual crime charged—unlawful assembly.71  The court 
threatened the jurors by telling them that “[t]he law of England 
will not allow you to part till you have given in your [v]erdict,”72 
and warned “you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict 
that the court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without 
meat, drink, fire, and tobacco . . . we will have a verdict . . . or 
you shall starve for it.”73  The jury was brought back to court the 
next morning, and found both Penn and Mead not guilty.74  The 
jurors were all fined and imprisoned until the fine was paid.75 
The foreperson, Edward Bushel, filed a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus.  The reviewing court noted the absence of any allegation 
that the jury “acquitted the persons indicted, against full and 
manifest evidence corruptly.”76  Accordingly, “how manifest 
soever the evidence was, if it were not manifest to [the jury], and 
that they believed it such, it was not a finable fault, nor 
deserving imprisonment.”77  The writ was ultimately granted and 
the jurors were released from prison.78 
 
67 Id. at 961. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 962. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 964–65. 
72 Id. at 962. 
73 Id. at 963. 
74 Id. at 966. 
75 Id. at 967–68. 
76 Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, 6 HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 1005 
(1670). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1024. 
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Bushel’s Case, decided in 1670, is widely regarded as the 
seminal case for the independence of a jury.79  Following this 
decision, imprisonment could no longer be used to punish a jury 
for returning a verdict that the trial court found disagreeable.80  
However, “[i]n the early stages of the legal history of England 
many of the rules regulating the conduct of the court and jury on 
trials were very strict.”81  Notably, jurors “were not permitted to 
separate, after they had been charged by the court, until they 
had rendered a verdict.”82  This rule was “carried so far that, if 
the jury failed to agree during the session of the court . . . [they] 
were held in confinement until they rendered a verdict.”83  It 
became “an established principle of the common law, in relation 
to the trial by jury, that after the jurors are once impaneled, they 
have no right to disperse, or take refreshments without the leave 
of the court.”84   
Although courts slowly began to recognize the limited value 
of sequestration, New York case law from the early 1800s reveals 
that it was still the practice to sequester jurors and deprive them 
of various necessities because appeals were based upon the fact 
that jurors separated without court authorization and 
supervision.  In Smith v. Thompson, “two of the jurors eluded the 
care of the constable, left the jury room, and one of them 
remained at a neighboring tavern during the night.”85  Both of 
the jurors returned the next morning and found for the plaintiff.  
The court held that “[i]t was clearly irregular in the two jurors to 
separate from their fellows,” but declined to set aside the 
verdict.86  In People v. Douglass, two of the jurors separated from 
the rest of the jury without permission from the trial judge.87  
The two jurors not only ate and consumed liquor, but freely 
“conversed on the subject of the trial.”88  As an implicit 
 
79 Mark Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency and Accountability in the Litigation 
Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 27 (1990). 
80 See Nancy Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV., 877, 
950, n.336 (1999) (“Although this case did not officially recognize the right of juries 
to decide questions of law, it did establish that juries could not be punished for 
acquitting a defendant, thus establishing the power of the criminal jury to nullify.”). 
81 Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 553 (1859). 
82 Id. at 554. 
83 Id. 
84 People v. Ransom, 7 Wend. 417, 423 (Sup. Ct. 1831). 
85 Smith v. Thompson, 1 Cow. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1823). 
86 Id. 
87 People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. 26, 33 (Sup. Ct. 1825). 
88 Id. at 35. 
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recognition of the limited value of sequestration, the New York 
Supreme Court of Judicature held that separation of a jury 
against the orders of the court would not be a basis to set aside 
the verdict in the absence of “any farther abuse.”89  However, 
given the allegations of jury misconduct during the separation in 
Douglass, a new trial was ordered.90 
What is notable about Douglass is that it recognized the 
authority of judges to permit a jury to separate during the trial, 
and declined to adopt a per se reversal rule even in cases of 
unauthorized jury separations.91  The Douglass court and other 
New York courts at the time relied on King v. Kinnear, for the 
authority to separate a deliberating jury.92  In Kinnear, the 
defendants were indicted for misdemeanor conspiracy.93  The 
trial began at 10:00 a.m. and continued until approximately 
11:00 p.m., when the prosecution finally finished presenting 
evidence.94  Given the late hour, it became “a matter of necessity 
to adjourn” the case until the following morning.95  The jury, 
without either the knowledge or consent of the defendants or 
judge, “separated and went to their respective homes.”96  The 
unauthorized separation was not discovered until after the jury 
reached a verdict.  In declining to set aside the verdict, the court 
held that “standing alone,” an unauthorized separation of a jury 
“is not sufficient to vacate the verdict.”97  The court further held 
that “the law has vested a discretion in the [j]udge, to allow the 
jury to go to their homes, during the necessary adjournment in 
each particular case; and, therefore, that no sufficient ground has 
been laid [to set aside the verdict].”98 
 
 
89 Id. at 36. The Supreme Court of Judicature was a court of general as well as 
appellate jurisdiction. See Williams Press Inc. v. Flavin, 35 N.Y.2d 499, 503, 323 
N.E.2d 693, 694, 364 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (1974). It was the highest court of law in 
New York until 1846. Id. 
90 Douglass, 4 Cow. at 35–36. 
91 Id. at 36. (“We do mean to be understood, however, as saying, that the mere 
separation of the jury, without any farther abuse, is not sufficient ground for setting 
aside a verdict; though it may deserve severe reprehension from the court.”). 
92 Douglass, 4 Cow. at 33; King v. Kinnear, 2 B. & Ald. 462 (K.B. 1819). 
93 Kinnear, 2 B. & Ald. at 462. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 464. 
96 Id. at 462. 
97 Id. at 466. 
98 Id. at 465. 
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Kinnear was relied upon by New York courts for two related 
propositions—that a court had the authority to separate a jury 
contrary to the common law requirement of sequestration, and 
that separation of a jury, without more, is an insufficient basis to 
set aside a verdict.99  Kinnear makes another equally important 
point: keeping a jury in court for long periods of time may be 
“most injurious to the cause of the defendants, that their case 
should be heard by a jury, whose minds were exhausted by 
fatigue.”100  This observation is an acknowledgment of the 
coercive nature of mandatory sequestration and its potential to 
do more harm than good. 
In 1859, the New York Court of Appeals,101 the state’s 
highest court, echoed this sentiment in Stephens v. People: 
Where jurors are subjected to a long confinement their patience 
is exhausted, their power of endurance is weakened 
and . . . unable to give the necessary consideration to a long and 
often complicated case, involving the life of a fellow-man, when 
 
99 Ransom, 7 Wend. at 424; Smith v. Thompson, 1 Cow. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1823); 
Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 557 (1859). 
100 Kinnear, 2 B. & Ald., at 464. 
101 New York appellate courts are comprised of various intermediate appellate 
courts, as well as the Court of Appeals. An appeal from a judgment of the Supreme 
Court or County Court (the trial-level courts for felony cases) must be taken to the 
appellate division of the department in which such judgment was entered. N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.60 (McKinney 2018). New York State is divided into four 
“departments” and accordingly, there is an appellate division for each department. 
See New York State Judicial Departments and Districts, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Court/Dept-Districts.html (last visited, Aug. 26, 
2018). 
 Criminal defendants have a statutory right to appeal a judgment of conviction to 
an intermediate appellate court. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.10(1). Intermediate 
appellate courts can review rulings when the alleged errors have been “preserved” 
by an objection, made with specificity. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2). The 
intermediate appellate court may also review unpreserved claims “in the interest of 
justice,” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 470.15(3)(c), (6)(a), or may find that a conviction 
was “in whole or in part, against the weight of the evidence.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 470.15(5). 
 An appeal to the Court of Appeals from an intermediate appellate court is by 
permission only, and requires a certificate granting leave to appeal, issued by either 
“a judge of the court of appeals or . . . a justice of the appellate division of the 
department which entered the order sought to be appealed.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 460.20(2)(a). The Court of Appeals may only review “question[s] of law” and is not 
authorized to review issues reached by the intermediate appellate court “in the 
interest of justice.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.20(1); see People v. Caban, 14 
N.Y.3d 369, 373, 927 N.E.2d 1050, 1051, 901 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (2010) (“[A]n 
Appellate Division reversal that is based on an unpreserved error is considered an 
exercise of the Appellate Division's interest of justice power, not reviewable in [the 
Court of Appeals].”). 
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it is finally committed to them.  Jurors are generally charged, in 
such cases, to hold no conversations on the subject of the trial, 
but in the long and dreary nights of their confinement a 
compliance with such charge is very difficult.102   
In addition to recognizing that sequestration can undermine 
the integrity of the deliberative process, the Court of Appeals also 
recognized that sequestration does little to ensure that the 
integrity of the jury is not compromised.  The court observed that 
“[a]ttempts to bribe jurors would be very hazardous” and had 
“little prospect of success.”103  Further, any attempt to tamper 
with an unsequestered jury would usually be in favor of the 
defendant because “[t]here have been but few, if any, attempts to 
corrupt a juror in behalf of the prosecution.”104  The court also 
noted that sequestration was an outmoded practice given “[t]he 
great improvement in the character, intelligence and position of 
jurors . . . .”105 
Not every jurisdiction shared this view.  In a case decided by 
the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1812, during a “temporary 
adjournment of the court, [a juror] went to the house at which he 
boarded . . . [and] was absent 15 or 20 minutes.”106  Although 
there was no evidence of juror tampering, the court reversed the 
conviction and held that “keeping the jury together until they 
agree without communication with others” is the only means by 
which impartiality can be guaranteed.107  Committed to the  
 
 
 
102 Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 554–55 (1859). Some intermediate appellate 
courts, recognizing the coercive nature of sequestration have even reversed 
convictions when juries were informed that they would be sequestered if they did not 
reach a verdict. In People v. Nelson, an appellate court reversed a narcotics sale 
conviction after the trial judge told the deadlocked jury that they were to return the 
next morning for further deliberations and that they should come prepared for the 
possibility of being sequestered overnight in the event they did not reach a verdict 
by the end of the day. 30 A.D.3d 351, 352, 818 N.Y.S.2d 204, 204 (1st Dep’t 2006). 
103 Stephens, 19 N.Y. at 555. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 556. Stephens dealt with an alleged sequestration violation which 
occurred during the trial, as opposed to during deliberations. After each day, the 
trial court, with the consent of the defendant, allowed the juror to return to their 
homes for the evening and come back to court the following day. Id. at 553–55. The 
Court of Appeals found that separation of a jury during the trial, without more, is an 
insufficient basis to set aside a verdict. Id. at 568–69. However, the holding is 
limited to a pre-deliberation separation of a jury with the consent of the defendant. 
106 Commonwealth v. McCaul, 3 Va. Cas. 271, 303 (Va. 1812). 
107 McCaul, 3 Va. Cas. at 302. 
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necessity of this practice, the court held that it “will preserve 
‘with fear and jealousy,’ and will not expose the trial by jury in 
criminal cases, to such risque of contamination . . . .”108 
The perceived value of mandatory sequestration thus began 
to vary based upon jurisdiction, as did the remedy for violating it.  
Although New York State seemed to recognize that mandatory 
sequestration does little to ensure that a defendant receive a fair 
trial, it remained an element of trials in New York State.  In the 
1881 codification of New York’s criminal procedure laws,109 § 421 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure limited mandatory 
sequestration to jury deliberations.110  Specifically, it provided: 
After hearing the charge, the jury may either decide in court, or 
may retire for deliberation.  If they do not agree without 
retiring, one or more officers must be sworn, to keep them 
together in some private and convenient place, and not to 
permit any person to speak to or communicate with them, nor 
do so themselves, unless it be by order of the court, or to ask 
them whether they have agreed upon a verdict, and to return 
them into court when they have so agreed, or when ordered by 
the court.111   
Although sequestration during deliberations was still 
mandatory, specific laws were enacted to expressly ensure that 
jurors were not starved into agreement.  Sections 423 and 424 of 
the former Code of Criminal Procedure mandated that a  
 
 
108 Id. at 305. The evolution of Virginia law on sequestration provides an 
interesting contrast to that of New York. In the early 1800s, Virginia adopted a rule 
requiring per se reversal of cases where a jury unnecessarily separated. Id. at 306. 
That rule was in place until the late 1800s and was subsequently softened to create 
a presumption of prejudice that the government had to refute. Owens v. 
Commonwealth, 167 S.E. 377, 379 (Va. 1933). In 1922, Virginia made sequestration 
discretionary in all but capital cases. See Robinson v. Virginia, 28 S.E.2d 10, 11 (Va. 
1943), and it subsequently made it fully discretionary. VA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. 
19.2-264 (1950). See McFalls v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Va. 1967) (citing 
Code of Va § 19.1-213 (1950)). By contrast, in the 1800s, New York did not mandate 
per se reversal in cases of unnecessary jury separation. See infra note 205. Yet, it 
was not until 2001 that sequestration became discretionary in New York. See infra 
note 125 and accompanying text. 
109 Act of June 1, 1881, ch. 442, 1881 N.Y. Laws 601 (enacting Code of Criminal 
Procedure). 
110 Sequestration before deliberations was authorized but not mandatory. See 
former N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 414 (1881) (“The jurors sworn to try an 
indictment may, at any time before the submission of the cause to the jury, in the 
discretion of the court, be permitted to separate, or be kept in charge of proper 
officers.”). 
111 Former N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 421 (1881). 
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deliberating jury be provided with “suitable furniture, fuel, lights 
and stationery,” as well as “suitable and sufficient food and 
lodging.”112 
The rule mandating sequestration during deliberations was 
preserved when the Code of Criminal Procedure was replaced 
with the Criminal Procedure Law in 1971.113  Section 310.10, 
which mandated sequestration during deliberations in all cases 
until 1995, replaced § 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
However, following at least one unsuccessful attempt to amend 
the law in 1987,114 in 1995 the Legislature relaxed the mandatory 
sequestration requirement.  Primarily a cost saving 
mechanism,115 CPL § 310.10(2) was created to permit a judge to 
allow a jury to separate for up to 24 hours if the defendant was 
not charged with a “class A felony or a class B violent felony 
offense or a class C violent felony.”116  In so doing, the 
accompanying bill memorandum stated that “New York [was] the 
only State that mandates deliberating juries to be sequestered 
from the time testimony ends until a verdict is reached.”117  The 
Legislature also recognized that juries are frequently not 
sequestered during the evidentiary phase of the trial, thus 
undermining an argument that sequestration during 
deliberations serves an important purpose.118 
 
112 Other jurisdictions had rules which, on their face, continued the coercive 
nature of sequestration. In a 1984 decision, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held 
that the current statute “provides that jurors are to be kept together without food or 
drink except water unless otherwise ordered by the court. This language is over a 
hundred years old and is reminiscent of a time when jurors were the virtual 
prisoners of court officers.” State v. Holly, 350 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. Ct. 
1984). The court found this provision of the statute to be “punitive and inappropriate 
and [directed that it] should be removed.” Id. 
113 N.Y. Sess. Laws Chapter 996, 2147 (McKinney 2018). 
114 STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST, LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING 
COMMISSION, ALBANY NY (1987) at A512, A7506. The proposed 1987 amendment 
would have eliminated mandatory sequestration of jurors in all cases except in class 
A and B felony cases. This was a slightly more expansive amendment than the 
version proposed and adopted in 1995. 
115 There apparently was some opposition to eliminating mandatory 
sequestration from the Court Officer’s Union given the effect it would have on 
overtime. See Somini Sengupta, New Law Releases Juries in New York From 
Sequestering, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/ 
31/nyregion/new-law-releases-juries-in-new-york-from-sequestering.html. 
116 Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 83, 1995 N.Y. Laws 111–12. 
117 Bill Memorandum, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 1995 A.B. 8063, 218th Leg. Reg. Sess. 
(1995). This assertion was not correct. There are still six jurisdictions that mandate 
sequestration during deliberations in all cases. 
118 Id. 
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Once the statute was amended, a survey was conducted to 
evaluate the effects of the now authorized separations.119  
Between July 5, 1995 and February 14, 1997, the Office of Court 
Administration collected data from all criminal trials in which 
the jury deliberated, regardless of whether the jury was 
sequestered.120  Juries separated during deliberations in 688 
cases and only one mistrial was granted for reasons relating to 
the jury’s separation during deliberations.121  Further, there was 
no appreciable difference between the time a separated jury 
deliberated and the time a sequestered jury deliberated.122  The 
study ultimately concluded that the “experiment permitting 
deliberating juries in criminal trials to separate [had] been 
successful.”123  Jurors no longer had to bear the burden of 
sequestration, and “[t]he predicted negative impact—more 
mistrials and increased costs—simply did not occur.”124  
Accordingly, in 2001, the statute was amended to its current 
form, authorizing judges to permit juries to separate in all 
criminal cases at the close of court on one day, and resume 
deliberations on the next day that the courts are open for 
business.125  Although the “24-hour rule” is an improvement over 
past practices, it deprives judges of much-needed flexibility in 
dealing with unpredictable instances of juror unavailability. 
IV. CASE LAW INTERPRETING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 
§ 310.10(2) 
The limited case law arising from claimed violations of the 
“24-hour rule” in CPL § 310.10(2) has not clarified whether and 
under what circumstances a defendant is entitled to a mistrial 
without the need to show prejudice if deliberations do not resume 
within the statutory time period.  Trial judges are therefore 
understandably hesitant to deviate from the statutory mandate 
 
119 The report was mandated by the Legislature. At the same time that CPL § 
310.10(2) was enacted, the Legislature enacted CPL § 310.10(3). See Act of June 20, 
1995, ch. 83, 1995 N.Y. Laws 111–12. That section provided that “[t]he chief 
administrator of the office of court administration shall prepare a report on the 
number of cases where the court separated the jury pursuant to this section.” 
120 HON. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, SEPARATION AND SEQUESTRATION OF 
DELIBERATING JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 5 (1999). 
121 Id. at 5–6. 
122 See generally id. 
123 Id. at 16. 
124 Id. 
125 Act of May 30, 2001, ch. 47, 2001 N.Y. Laws 102. 
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and adjourn deliberations, even in cases of necessity, or to deny 
motions for mistrial when there is a recess in deliberations in 
excess of the 24-hour period. 
A violation of CPL § 310.10(2), if viewed as a “mode of 
proceeding” error, would require an automatic mistrial or 
reversal on appeal.  A mode of proceeding error is a doctrine 
unique to New York that is best described as “an umbrella term 
for a loose grouping of various process-oriented errors,” usually 
occurring during the course of the trial.126  These types of errors 
are said to undermine “the essential validity of the process and 
are so fundamental that the entire trial is irreparably tainted 
[when a mode of proceeding error occurs].”127 
The mode of proceeding doctrine has its origins in an 1858 
decision of the Court of Appeals—Cancemi v. People.128  In that 
case, one of the jurors was discharged and, with the consent of 
the defendant, the murder trial proceeded with, and the verdict 
was rendered by, only eleven jurors.129  At the time, New York 
had no provision for a defendant to waive a jury in a felony 
prosecution; it was not until 1938 that the State Constitution 
was amended to permit a defendant to waive his jury rights in all 
non-capital cases.130  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that 
the defendant’s waiver of a twelve-person jury was invalid and it 
reversed his conviction, reasoning as follows: 
[T]he right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to affect, by 
consent, the conduct of the case [is] much more limited than in 
civil actions.  It should not be permitted to extend so far as to 
work radical changes in great and leading provisions as to the 
organization of the tribunals or the mode of proceeding 
prescribed by the constitution and the laws.131  
The Court of Appeals further explained the mode of 
proceeding doctrine in People v. Patterson, when it rejected a 
claim requiring a murder defendant to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional 
 
126 Gary Muldoon, Understanding New York’s “Mode of Proceeding” Muddle, 59 
BUFFALO L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2011). 
127 People v. Kelly, 5 N.Y.3d 116, 119, 832 N.E.2d 1179, 1181, 799 N.Y.S.2d 763, 
765 (2005). 
128 18 N.Y. 128 (1858). 
129 Id. at 131. 
130 People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 443–44, 880 N.E.2d 863, 866, 850 N.Y.S.2d 
377, 380 (2007). 
131 Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137. 
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disturbance and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof.132  
Although the court held that the defendant’s due process rights 
were protected by the prosecution’s initial burden of having to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt his intent to kill his victim, it 
nevertheless acknowledged that in certain instances, not present 
in the case before it, a trial error “that . . . affect[s] the 
organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed 
by law,” would result in reversal even without preservation of the 
error at trial.133  The purpose of the doctrine, the court stated, “is 
to ensure that criminal trials are conducted in accordance with 
the mode of procedure mandated by Constitution and statute.  
Where the procedure adopted by the court below is at a basic 
variance with the mandate of law, the entire trial is irreparably 
tainted.”134  The court further explained that “where the court 
had no jurisdiction, or where the right to trial by jury was 
disregarded, or where there was a fundamental, nonwaivable 
defect in the mode of procedure, then an appellate court must 
reverse, even though the question was not formally raised 
below.”135 
As the doctrine has developed, it has become more difficult to 
understand and therefore predict which procedural errors fall 
under the mode of proceeding umbrella because “[w]ith each area 
that the Court of Appeals has found a mode [of proceeding] 
violation, the court has seemingly found the need to emphasize 
the narrowness of the issue, and often to deny its application in a 
later case.”136  Some errors that have been classified as 
implicating the mode of proceeding doctrine include a trial 
judge’s failure to preside over portions of the trial by delegating 
responsibility to a law secretary,137 failing to disclose to the 
defense the full contents of a jury note before responding to it,138 
violating a defendant’s right to be present at material stages of 
the proceeding,139 and the conviction of a nonexistent crime.140 
 
132 39 N.Y.2d 288, 301, 347 N.E.2d 898, 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976), aff’d, 
432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
133 Id. at 295, 347 N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577. 
134 Id. at 295–96, 347 N.E.2d at 932, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577–78. 
135 Id., 347 N.E.2d at 932, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577–78. 
136 Muldoon, supra note 126, at 1206. 
137 People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984, 
985 (1985). 
138 People v. O’Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 279, 579 N.E.2d 189, 193, 574 N.Y.S.2d 
159, 163 (1991). 
139 People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 827, 832, 18 N.E.3d 367, 370, 993 N.Y.S.2d 656, 
659 (2017). 
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Designating a procedural error as a “mode of proceeding” 
error has significant ramifications—the most important of which 
is that it results in reversal of a conviction without any 
consideration of the prejudice that the error may have caused.141  
Prejudice will be presumed when a mode of proceeding error 
occurs and there is no opportunity for the prosecution to rebut 
that presumption.142  Additionally, mode of proceeding errors 
cannot be waived or consented to by a defendant.143  For example, 
in People v. Ahmed, the trial judge’s law secretary responded to 
several jury notes, which included a request for a rereading of 
the instructions on reasonable doubt.144  Notwithstanding the 
defendant’s consent, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction 
and held that “the absence of the trial judge, and the delegation 
of some of his duties to his law secretary . . . deprived the 
defendant of his right to a trial by jury, an integral component of 
which is the supervision of a judge.”145 
As shown by the Patterson case, in addition to being non-
waivable, mode of proceeding errors can also be reviewed by an 
appellate court even though the complained of error was not 
preserved by a proper objection.146  Under New York law, in order 
to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must object and 
state with specificity the reasons why the complained of ruling 
was error.147  If the ruling is not corrected after the objection, the 
issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.  Generally, 
alleged errors which are unpreserved can only be reviewed on  
 
 
 
140 People v. Martinez, 81 N.Y.2d 810, 812, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278, 595 N.Y.S.2d 
376, 377 (1993). 
141 People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 540, 55 N.E.3d. 1041, 1046, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68, 
73 (2016) (holding that “[m]ode of proceedings errors are immune not only from the 
rules governing preservation and waiver but also from harmless error analysis”). 
142 Id., 55 N.E.3d. at 1046, 36 N.Y.S.3d at 73. 
143 People v. Becoats, 17 N.Y.3d 643, 650, 958 N.E.2d 865, 867, 934 N.Y.S.2d 
737, 739 (2011) (“A defendant in a criminal case cannot waive, or even consent to, 
error that would affect the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings 
pr[e]scribed by law”) (quoting People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 294, 347 N.E.2d 
898, 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (1976)); see also Mack, 27 N.Y.3d at 539, 55 N.E.3d 
at 1046, 36 N.Y.S.3d at 73; rehearing denied, 28 N.Y.3d 944, 60 N.E.3d 407, 38 
N.Y.S.3d 513 (Mem) (2016). 
144 People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 309, 487 N.E.2d 894, 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984, 
985 (1985). 
145 Id., 487 N.E.2d at 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 985. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 132–135. 
147 N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.05(2) (McKinney 2018). 
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appeal under limited circumstances, such as when an 
intermediate appellate court, in the exercise of its discretion, 
reviews a claim “in the interest of justice.”148 
Apart from interest of justice jurisdiction, mode of 
proceeding errors are another exception to the preservation rule 
and can be reviewed by both intermediate appellate courts and 
the Court of Appeals in the absence of a timely objection.149  
Thus, if an alleged error is classified as a mode of proceeding 
error, then the Court of Appeals is empowered to review it even if 
the issue was not preserved in the trial court.150 
Although the Court of Appeals has not ruled on whether a 
violation of CPL § 310.10(2) is a mode of proceeding error, it 
temporarily classified a violation of the earlier, mandatory 
sequestration requirement as a mode of proceeding error, 
requiring automatic reversal.  In People v. Coons, deliberating 
jurors were permitted to “go to their homes for dinner, separately 
and unsupervised.”151  At the time of the trial, CPL § 310.10(2) 
had not yet been enacted and, accordingly, judges were required 
to sequester juries during deliberations.152  Although the 
defendant in Coons did not object to the separation of the 
deliberating jurors, the Court of Appeals classified the violation 
as a mode of proceeding error, reversed the conviction, and held 
 
148 N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.15(3)(c). The basis of a discretionary reversal of a 
judgment in the “interest of justice” includes, but is not limited to, a determination 
that an “error or defect . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” N.Y. CRIM. PRO. 
LAW § 470.15(6)(a). “Interest of justice” jurisdiction is conferred solely on 
intermediate appellate courts; the Court of Appeals is exclusively a court of law. 
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.20(6); People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492 n.1, 900 
N.E.2d 946, 950 n.1, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399 n.1 (2008). 
149 The authority of the Court of Appeals to review unpreserved “mode of 
proceeding” errors is derived from CPL § 470.35(1), which provides that the Court of 
Appeals may consider “any question of law involving alleged error or defect in the 
criminal court proceedings resulting in the original criminal court 
judgment, . . . regardless of whether such question was raised” in the intermediate 
appellate court. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 470.35(1). A mode of proceeding error is 
classified as a “question of law.” People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 296, 347 N.E.2d 
898, 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (1976). 
150 Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 296, 347 N.E.2d at 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 578. 
151 People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 797, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94, 
95 (1990). 
152 The requirement that jurors be “continuously kept together” during 
deliberations remains in effect, as provided in CPL § 310.10(1). N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW 
§ 310.10(1). However, based on the phrase, “except as otherwise provided by 
subdivision two of this section,” the trial court has discretion to permit the jurors to 
return home each evening so long as the “24-hour rule” in CPL § 310.10(2) is 
observed. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 310.10(2). 
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that “[e]rrors which ‘affect the organization of the court or the 
mode of proceedings prescribed by law’ need not be preserved 
and, even if acceded to, still present a question of law for this 
court to review.”153 
Less than two years later, in People v. Webb,154 the Court of 
Appeals was faced with another case that involved the separation 
of a jury in violation of the mandatory sequestration rule.  
However, unlike in Coons, the defendant in Webb, in the 
presence of his counsel, expressly consented, on the record, to the 
proposed separation of the jury during deliberations.155  The issue 
in Webb was whether the mandatory sequestration rule could be 
waived given the recent mode of proceeding classification in 
Coons.156 
The court, citing Coons, rejected the defendant’s attempt to 
equate an error that is “sufficiently linked to the mode of 
proceedings so as not to require preservation,” with an error 
“which necessarily entails a part of the process so essential to the 
form and conduct of the actual trial that the defendant may not 
waive it.”157  The court found the defendant’s reasoning—“what 
need not be preserved may not be waived”—to be fatally flawed, 
and held that “the sequestration provision does not implicate 
fundamental rights that are an integral part of the trial itself.”158  
Moreover, the court noted, the “requirement that a deliberating 
jury be sequestered is entirely statutory and reflects no 
established common-law right of the defendant.”159  But, most 
importantly, the court reasoned: 
The protection which the provision affords a defendant does not 
relate to the actual trial proceeding or to how, by what proof or 
by whom a defendant may be tried and adjudged guilty.  Rather 
CPL 310.10 relates to what happens after completion of the trial 
proper and simply prescribes the separate place, outside the 
courtroom, the supervisory personnel and interdiction against 
anyone speaking to or being permitted to speak to any of the  
 
 
153 Coons, 75 N.Y.2d at 797, 551 N.E.2d at 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (internal 
citations omitted). 
154 People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, 336, 581 N.E.2d 509, 509, 575 N.Y.S.2d 656, 
656 (1991). 
155 Id. at 336–37, 581 N.E.2d at 509–10, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656–57. 
156 Id., 581 N.E.2d at 509–10, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 656–57. 
157 Id. at 337–38, 581 N.E.2d at 510–11, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 657–58. 
158 Id. at 338, 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
159 Id., 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
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jurors.  Thus, we conclude that the sequestration requirement 
does not entail a right of defendant that is so essential to the 
trial proceeding that it may never be waived.160  
Significantly, the court noted that the “ancient common-law 
practice of keeping the jurors locked up without food or drink, 
and sometimes without heat and light, until they reached a 
verdict was simply to force them to agree,” as opposed “to 
protect[ing] the defendant by keeping the deliberating jurors from 
being improperly influenced by contacts with or communications 
from outside sources . . . .”161 
By holding that a defendant can waive the sequestration 
requirement, the Court of Appeals implicitly removed the mode 
of proceeding classification.  Indeed, not only are mode of 
proceeding errors exempt from the preservation requirement, 
they “are not waivable and therefore require reversal even if the 
defense affirmatively consents to the court’s action.”162  Further, 
the court in Coons had specifically held that mode of proceeding 
errors still present “a question of law for this court to review” 
even “if acceded to.”163  Thus, the holding in Webb was completely 
at odds with the holding in Coons. 
That Webb effectively overruled Coons was made clear by the 
Court of Appeals in People v. Agramonte, a consolidated appeal of 
two separate cases decided when sequestration was still 
mandatory.164  In each case, the deliberating jurors were 
permitted to dine with the alternate jurors in violation of both 
CPL § 310.10 and CPL § 270.30(1).165  No objection was raised by 
the defendant in either case before the jurors and alternates were 
sent to dinner together.166  The court acknowledged that in 
Coons, it had concluded that a violation of the mandatory 
sequestration rule was a “mode of proceedings error,” but 
 
160 Id., 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
161 Id. at 340 n.*, 581 N.E.2d at 511 n.*, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658 n.* (emphasis in 
original). 
162 People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 543, 55 N.E.3d. 1041, 1049, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68, 
76 (2016). 
163 People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 797, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94, 
95 (1990). 
164 People v. Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 767, 665 N.E.2d 164, 165, 642 N.Y.S.2d 
594, 595 (1996). 
165 CPL § 270.30(1) requires that “[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the 
court must . . . direct the alternate jurors not to discuss the case and . . . be kept 
separate and apart from the regular jurors.” 
166 See Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d at 770, 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
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admitted that it had done so “without discussion of the 
underlying requirement.”167  The court relied exclusively on its 
reasoning in Webb, noting that in that case it had “clarified” that 
“the sequestration requirement does not ‘entail[] a part of the 
process essential to the form and conduct of the actual trial’ [nor 
does it] . . . ‘implicate fundamental rights that are an integral 
part of the trial itself.’ ”168  Reaffirming the viability of Webb over 
Coons, the court added: “Webb makes plain that the failure to 
sequester the deliberating jurors does not constitute a 
fundamental deviation from the proper mode of judicial 
proceedings,” and “do[es] not fall within the ‘one very narrow 
exception to the requirement of a timely objection.’ ”169 
The Court of Appeals’ brief classification of a sequestration 
violation as a mode of proceeding error is difficult to understand.  
While the court on other occasions has removed the “mode of 
proceeding” classification from certain types of error, the brevity 
with which this occurred in the context of jury sequestration is 
unusual.170  The decision in Coons is even more perplexing since 
the court denied leave to appeal in at least one pre-Coons case 
where a defendant waived the sequestration requirement.  In 
People v. Silvernail, the jury was not sequestered with the 
consent of the defendant.171  The conviction was affirmed by the 
intermediate appellate court, finding that a jury can be properly 
separated during deliberations, with the consent of the 
defendant.172  A judge of the Court of Appeals subsequently 
denied leave to appeal.173  In 1982, the Chief Administrative 
Judge of New York State stated that “there is no basis in 
constitutional mandate, logic or experience which should compel 
our continued blind adherence to a system in which deliberating 
jurors in all criminal cases are held in a virtual state of 
 
167 Id., 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
168 Id., 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (emphasis in original). 
169 Id., 665 N.E.2d at 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 
(1976)). 
170 Waiving a twelve-person jury was “declassified” as a mode of proceeding 
error after the State Constitution was amended to permit a defendant to waive a 
jury trial in a felony case. Compare Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 129 (1858) with 
People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 448, 880 N.E.2d 863, 870, 850 N.Y.S.2d 377, 384 
(2007). 
171 People v. Silvernail, 55 A.D.2d 72, 75, 389 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (3d Dep’t 1976). 
172 Id. at 75–76, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 643–44. 
173 People v. Silvernail, 41 N.Y.2d 869, 362 N.E.2d 635, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1037 
(Table) (1977). 
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imprisonment until their verdicts are rendered.”174  Further, in 
2001, when the current version of CPL § 310.10(2) was enacted, 
the late Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye, who joined in 
the Coons decision, celebrated the end of mandatory 
sequestration—noting that “[t]here’s no need to truck [jurors] out 
to hotels, separate them from their lives and their families in 
every case.”175 
A possible explanation for the court’s decision to briefly 
classify a sequestration violation as a mode of proceeding error is 
that the court may have inadvertently conflated the different 
types of sequestration violations.  The statute, as it existed when 
Coons was decided, had three separate mandates: (1) keeping the 
jury together at all times after deliberations begin; 
(2) prohibiting other individuals from speaking with the jury, 
except by order of the court; and (3) prohibiting anyone but 
deliberating jurors from entering the jury room.176 
In classifying a sequestration violation as a mode of 
proceeding error, the court in Coons cited to People v. Bouton, an 
appeal from convictions for sexual abuse and related offenses 
that involved a violation of CPL § 310.10 different from that 
which occurred in Coons.177  On the morning of the day the 
verdict was announced, a court clerk inadvertently delivered to 
the jury items that had never been admitted into evidence.178  
These items included two versions of defendant’s confessions 
from which a reference to uncharged sexual activity had not been 
redacted.179  The same clerk, after realizing that prohibited 
material had been delivered to the jury, made an unauthorized 
entry into the jury room to retrieve the unadmitted evidence.180  
In reversing the convictions, the court noted, while citing to CPL 
§ 310.10, “[t]he strong public policy favoring the absolute 
confidentiality of jury deliberations,” and the prohibition against 
 
174 Evans, Mandatory Jury Sequestration Deemed Archaic by Administrative 
Judge, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1982, at 25, col. 4, at 32, col. 4. 
175 Somini Sengupta, New Law Releases Juries in New York From Sequestering, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/31/nyregion/new-law-
releases-juries-in-new-york-from-sequestering.html. 
176 The second and third mandates remain under the current statute. The first 
is subject to the “24-hour rule” of CPL § 310.10(2). 
177 People v. Coons, 75 N.Y.2d 796, 797, 551 N.E.2d 587, 588, 552 N.Y.S.2d 94, 
95 (1990) (citing People v. Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d 130, 138, 405 N.E.2d 699, 703, 428 
N.Y.S.2d 218, 222 (1980)). 
178 Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d at 136–37, 405 N.E.2d at 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 221. 
179 Id., 405 N.E.2d at 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 221. 
180 Id., 405 N.E.2d at 702, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 221. 
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dealing with “so-called ‘emergencies’ ” by anyone other than the 
trial court except “in the rarest and most inescapable of 
circumstances.”181 
The entry of the clerk into the jury room, an event that the 
Court of Appeals strongly condemned, indeed violated CPL § 
310.10.  That is a serious departure from proper procedure which 
could, and likely did, have an impact of the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.  Such an occurrence is a far cry from a brief separation 
of jurors during deliberations, which is a pure statutory violation 
that does not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights or 
expose the jury to tampering or improper influence.182  The 
court’s reliance on Coons in Bouton was thus inappropriate and 
conflated two very different types of CPL § 310.10 violations. 
Whatever the reason for the holding in Coons, it is over 
twenty-five years old and was implicitly overruled in Webb.183  
Further, since the Court of Appeals decided Agramonte, Coons 
has never been cited for the proposition that the failure to 
sequester a deliberating jury is a non-waivable, fundamental 
defect in the trial.184  It should therefore have no bearing on the 
proper remedy for a violation of the 24-hour rule of CPL § 
310.10(2) and, indeed, the lower appellate courts have thus far 
declined to classify violations of CPL § 310.10(2) as mode of 
proceeding errors.  For example, in People v. Encarnacion-Cross, 
the defendant was indicted and tried for possession of felony 
weight narcotics.185  Prior to jury selection, the judge announced 
that the trial would not be in session on Wednesday because that 
was the judge’s conference day.186  The intermediate appellate 
court held that “[d]efendant did not preserve his claims regarding 
 
181 Id. at 138, 405 N.E.2d at 703, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 222. 
182 See People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, 339–40, 581 N.E.2d 509, 511, 575 
N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (1991). 
183 Id., 581 N.E.2d at 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 658. 
184 The intermediate appellate courts that have cited Coons addressed issues 
similar to the claimed intrusion into deliberations that occurred in Bouton, rather 
than a failure to sequester a jury. See, e.g., People v. McKay, 214 A.D.2d 685, 686, 
625 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590 (2d Dep’t 1995) (finding reversible error in allowing a clerk to 
respond to a jury’s substantive legal question); People v. Lara, 199 A.D.2d 419, 419–
20, 605 N.Y.S.2d 339, 339 (2d Dep’t 1993) (finding mode of proceeding error when 
court sent message, through non-judicial staff member, that jury had to continue 
deliberating); People v. Boyd, 166 A.D.2d 659, 659, 561 N.Y.S.2d 257, 257 (2d Dep’t 
1990) (instructing a court officer “to go into the jury room and tell the [deadlocked] 
jury to continue deliberating” constituted a mode of proceeding error). 
185 132 A.D.3d 422, 423, 17 N.Y.S.3d 291, 291 (1st Dep’t 2015). 
186 Transcript of Record at 18–21, People v. Encarnacion-Cross, No. 685/2013, at 
12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Oct. 10, 2013). 
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events that transpired during jury deliberations, and there were 
no mode of proceeding errors exempt from preservation 
requirements.”187 
Because a violation of CPL § 310.10(2) is not a mode of 
proceeding error, the 24-hour rule can be waived by the 
defendant, although there is no requirement that the defendant 
personally waive the restriction.188  Waiver can be established by 
the defendant’s consent to extend a recess for a specific period. 
Waiver can also be established by a defendant’s failure to 
clearly and timely object to a recess which is in excess of the 24-
hour period.  In People v. Garcia, jury deliberations began on a 
Monday.189  On Friday, two jurors failed to appear, one because of 
illness and another (“juror number two”) due to an assault on her 
child that resulted in hospitalization.190  The defense moved for a 
mistrial arguing that the condition of juror number two’s child 
rendered the mother “ ‘grossly unqualified’ because she would not 
be able to concentrate on the case when she returned.”191 
On Monday, both jurors returned, but before deliberations 
resumed, the trial judge questioned juror number two and 
concluded that she remained qualified.192  Defendant then moved 
for a mistrial on the previously unstated ground that jury 
deliberations had been suspended for more than 24 hours, in 
violation of CPL § 310.10(2), but the court denied the motion as 
 
187 Encarnacion-Cross, 132 A.D.3d at 423, 17 N.Y.S.3d at 291 (citing People v. 
Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 770, 665 N.E.2d 164, 166, 642 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (1996)). 
The application of Encarnacion-Cross to CPL § 310.10(2) is not readily apparent 
from the appellate court’s opinion. The court uses the phrase “events that transpired 
during jury deliberations,” but does not expressly state that the claim of error 
relates to the length of a mid-deliberation recess. 
188 People v. Bello, 82 N.Y.2d 862, 863, 631 N.E.2d 104, 104, 609 N.Y.S.2d 162, 
162 (1993) (rejecting the argument that waiver of mandatory sequestration must be 
“made by the accused personally, and that his attorney's waiver on the record was 
insufficient”); see also In re Daniel Capellan v. Stone et al., 49 A.D.3d 121, 125, 849 
N.Y.S.2d 530, 533 (1st Dep’t 2008) (“The court's conclusion that the statute 
precludes a waiver of continuous deliberations is contrary to the decisional law 
interpreting both the predecessor statute of CPL § 310.10 and the statute as 
presently enacted.”). 
189 24 A.D.3d 308, 308, 808 N.Y.S.2d 34, 34 (1st Dep’t 2005), leave to appeal 
denied, 6 N.Y.3d 833, 847 N.E.2d 378, 814 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Table) (2006). 
190 The specific details of the jury issue were described in the subsequent habeas 
corpus petition. See Garcia v. Burge, 2008 WL 627508 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008) 
(report of magistrate judge), adopted by Garcia v Burge, 2009 WL 102142 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 15, 2009). 
191 Garcia, 2008 WL 627508 at *4. 
192 Id. 
2018] NEW YORK’S 24-HOUR JURY DELIBERATION RULE 219 
untimely.193  In affirming the conviction, the appellate court 
found that “[t]he record establishes that defendant waived his 
present contention that the court improperly suspended 
deliberations of the nonsequestered jury for more than the 
statutorily mandated period of 24 hours.”194 
Waiver can also be established by a defendant’s consent, 
obtained before the trial begins, to take a certain day of the week 
off during the trial.  This agreement will carry through to the 
deliberation phase and relieve the trial court of any statutory 
obligation to have the jury deliberate during that particular day 
of the week.  In People v. Mullings, defendant argued that his 
conviction should be reversed based upon a violation of the 
mandate of CPL § 310.10(2).195  The trial, which began in 
January 2012, lasted over six months.  Prior to the start of the 
trial, the court approved a request by the defense to not convene 
on Fridays.196  During deliberations, on Thursday, July 19, 2012, 
with no verdict having been reached, two jurors had unexpected 
developments that made their continued presence on Friday and 
the following Monday extremely difficult.197  One juror’s oldest 
daughter, who babysat for a younger sibling, needed tonsil 
surgery.198  The only person who could care for the younger child 
was the juror’s sister, who was unavailable until 5:00 p.m. on 
Monday.199  A second juror’s brother had been recently murdered 
and the juror was scheduled to travel to Mississippi for a 
memorial service.200  Without sufficient funds for a last-minute 
airline trip, the juror planned to drive, which would take him 22 
hours each way, thus making him unavailable to deliberate until 
5:00 p.m. on Monday.201 
 
 
193 Id. 
194 Garcia, 24 A.D.3d at 309, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 35. 
195 146 A.D.3d 816, 817, 44 N.Y.S.3d 550, 551 (2d Dep’t 2017), leave to appeal 
denied, 29 N.Y.3d 1084 (2017). 
196 Brief for Respondent at 24, People v. Mullings, 146 A.D.3d 816, 44 N.Y.S.3d 
550 (2d Dep’t 2017) (No. 10-1502) (“On January 3, 2012, [defendant] suggested to the 
court that it ‘might want to consider not working on Fridays.’ The court responded, 
‘yes we will take Fridays off’ [T-66-67].”). 
197 Transcript of Record at 8501–03, People v. Mullings, No. 1502N/2010 (Sup. 
Ct. Nassau Co. July 18, 2012). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 8510–12 (July 19, 2012). 
201 Id. at 8511. 
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Although the defense had requested that the trial be in 
recess on Fridays, counsel insisted on strict compliance with CPL 
§ 310.10(2) after learning of the jurors’ unavailability.202  Not 
surprisingly, the appellate court rejected the argument, holding 
that “[t]he defendant waived his contention that the Supreme 
Court violated the continuous deliberation rule set forth in CPL § 
310.10.”203 
These cases confirm that violations of CPL § 310.10(2) are 
not mode of proceeding errors and are thus subject to rules 
governing waiver, preservation, and harmless error.204  However, 
no case has thus far found a violation of the statute or opined on 
the appropriate remedy in the event of one. 
Confining CPL § 310.10(2) violations to non-emergency, 
planned separations, and requiring a mistrial or reversal only 
when a defendant is prejudiced, would be consistent with 
longstanding common law principles pre-dating the enactment of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure,205 and with case law interpreting 
 
202 Id. 
203 People v. Mullings, 146 A.D.3d 816, 817, 44 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (2d Dep’t 
2017). 
204 Under New York Law, a mistrial is warranted after the occurrence of “an 
error or legal defect in the proceedings, . . . which is prejudicial to the defendant and 
deprives him of a fair trial.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10(1) (McKinney 2018). 
Thus, a defendant who moves for a mistrial under this theory would be required to 
show prejudice. A mistrial is also warranted when a circumstance arises which 
makes it “physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law.” 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10(3). Mistrials under this section typically occur in 
extreme circumstances such as “when the judge or other essential court personnel 
are unavailable due to death or serious illness.” In re Marcus B, 95 A.D.3d 15, 19, 
942 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41 (1st Dep’t 2012). A mistrial under this section would also be 
warranted when a deliberating juror is appropriately discharged and there are no 
available alternate jurors, People v. Mason, 233 A.D.2d 271, 272, 600 N.Y.S.2d 131, 
132 (1st Dep’t 1996), when a disaster occurs that prevents the trial from continuing, 
People v. Perez, 15 A.D.3d 165, 166, 708 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (1st Dep’t 2005), when 
defense counsel is disqualified, In re Vilair Fonvil v. Molea, 299 A.D.2d 550, 550–51, 
750 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (2d Dep’t 2002), or in the event of a defense attorney’s 
suspension from the practice of law. People v. Anderson, 186 A.D.2d 140, 140, 587 
N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (2d Dep’t 1992). These events either physically prevent the trial 
from continuing, or implicate a fundamental right of the defendant. A brief and 
unexpected interruption of jury deliberations can hardly be equated with a disaster 
which renders the courthouse inaccessible for the near future, or the incapacity of 
either the defendant’s attorney or the presiding judge. 
205 In 1825, in People v. Douglass, two jurors separated from the deliberating 
jurors in order eat and drink “spirituous liquor,” and while doing so, they “conversed 
on the subject of the trial.” 4 Cow. 26, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1825). The court, noting the near 
unanimous rule that an improper separation of a jury, which did not prejudice the 
defendant, was not a sufficient basis for a mistrial or to set aside the verdict, found 
such prejudice under the facts of the case. Id. at 36. A slightly stricter approach was 
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violations of the mandatory sequestration provision in § 421 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure206 and its successor provision, 
CPL § 310.10 prior to the enactment of subsection (2).207  With 
the exception of the brief period between the Court of Appeals’ 
decisions in Coons and Webb, cases applying the mandatory 
sequestration provisions required defendants to demonstrate 
prejudice when seeking a reversal or moving for a mistrial based 
on an improper separation of the jury.  Moreover, separation of a 
deliberating jury in cases of necessity has never been viewed as a 
 
taken in Eastwood v. People, an 1855 murder case where approximately six jurors, 
without permission, separated from the rest of the jury and went to examine the 
murder scene. 3 Park. Cr. R. 25 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1955). The court noted that the 
“early doctrines of the common law in regard to the misconduct of jurors have been 
greatly modified in more modern times . . . . [A]fter . . . the trial commenced, they 
could not . . . be permitted to separate, except in cases of evident necessity, and that 
any unauthorized separation would be fatal to the verdict.” Id. at 41. The court 
concluded that a separation of a jury in a capital case would be grounds for a 
mistrial “unless . . . it is affirmatively shown on the part of the 
prosecution, . . . [beyond a reasonable doubt], that no injury could have resulted to 
the prisoner from the separation, the verdict will not be set aside.” Id. at 45. 
Nonetheless, even under this stricter approach, there was still no requirement of per 
se reversal. Id. 
206 In People v. Dunbar Contracting Co., the trial court permitted, during 
deliberations, “[s]ix jurors were taken to dine at one hotel, and six at another.” 215 
N.Y. 416, 416, 109 N.E. 554, 554 (1915). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 
“[d]uring prolonged deliberations, some degree of separation is often inevitable,” and 
noting that “[t]here are times and emergencies when the statute contemplates that 
leave of the court will justify a separation of jurors.” Id., 109 N.E. at 554. Even if the 
separation were improper, it would be not be a ground for reversal because the 
defendant suffered no prejudice. Id., 109 N.E. at 554 (“But even if the separation 
were to be thought an irregularity, no prejudice resulted.”). Similarly, in People v. 
Hoch, a juror became ill during trial and required a full day of medical treatment. 
150 N.Y. 291, 302, 44 N.E. 976, 980 (1896). Although a court officer was constantly 
with the juror during his absence, the separation was still, on its face, in violation of 
the sequestration statute. In declining to order a new trial, the Court of Appeals 
noted that “there was nothing in the incident, which could have prejudiced the 
defendant.” Id., 44 N.E. at 980. 
207 In People v. Fernandez, the trial court permitted “at least one juror to attend 
church services, during a lunch recess, [allegedly] unsupervised.” 183 A.D.2d 605, 
606, 586 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (1st Dep’t 1992), aff'd, 81 N.Y.2d 1023, 616 N.E.2d 497, 
599 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1993). In affirming the conviction, the intermediate appellate 
court opined: “During prolonged deliberations, some degree of separation is often 
inevitable. The trial court must determine to what extent it shall be allowed. We 
hold, therefore, that the division of the jurors did not infringe the defendants’ rights. 
But even if the separation were to be thought an irregularity, no prejudice resulted.” 
Id. at 606, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 247. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no reason to 
construe CPL § 310.10 differently from former Code of Criminal Procedure § 421. 
People v. Fernandez, 81 N.Y.2d 1023, 1024, 616 N.E.2d 497, 498, 599 N.Y.S.2d 911, 
912 (1993) (finding “no legislative intent to overrule our construction of the prior 
statute [that] has been called to our attention”).  
222 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:187   
violation of the mandatory sequestration provision requiring per 
se reversal.  Accordingly, because a defendant was required to 
demonstrate prejudice when sequestration was mandatory, he 
should have to do the same, if not more, when alleging a violation 
of CPL § 310.10(2).  And because separation in cases of necessity 
was not deemed to be a violation of the mandatory sequestration 
rule, it should not be considered a violation of the less restrictive 
limitation on recesses. 
At least one trial judge has expressly followed this approach 
under CPL § 310.10(2), holding that the statute is not violated 
when deliberations do not resume within the statutory period 
because of the unforeseen absence of a juror due to illness or 
other exigency.  In People v. Taylor, a juror was temporarily 
hospitalized during deliberations.208  The following day, the juror 
contacted the court and stated that “he was anxious to return to 
continue deliberations.”209  Although there was no articulable 
prejudice to the defendant, the defense moved for a mistrial, 
arguing that the juror’s one day absence violated CPL § 
310.10(2).210  The trial judge denied the application, holding that 
the restrictions of CPL § 310.10(2) were only meant to limit 
planned adjournments, “not to require a mistrial when an 
unavoidable event or other emergency occurs.”211  However, the 
defendant was ultimately acquitted and thus no appellate court 
had the opportunity to review the trial judge’s analysis.212  
Accordingly, Taylor does not provide any binding authority that 
judges may rely on when, in cases of necessity, one or more 
deliberating jurors is temporarily unable to return to court to 
resume deliberations within the time period specified in CPL § 
310.10(2). 
V. NO OTHER STATE HAS A PER SE RULE REQUIRING REVERSAL 
FOR UNPLANNED BUT NECESSARY SEPARATION OF JURORS 
DURING DELIBERATIONS 
The perceived value of jury sequestration varies widely 
thorough the country.  Some jurisdictions prohibit it except in the 
most exceptional cases.  These states take the view that 
sequestration causes prejudice to a defendant’s rights because 
 
208 People v. Taylor, 32 Misc. 3d 546, 548, 926 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
209 Id., N.Y.S.2d at 817. 
210 Id., N.Y.S.2d at 817. 
211 Id. at 554, N.Y.S.2d at 821. 
212 Id., N.Y.S.2d at 821. 
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the fear of being sequestered can coerce a jury to rush to verdict 
without adequate deliberation.  Other states consider 
sequestration an essential tool to ensure a defendant a fair trial.  
Common to almost all of these jurisdictions is the rule that 
separation of a jury, in violation of a statutorily mandated 
requirement for sequestration, is not grounds for a mistrial, 
especially in cases of emergency. 
There are currently twenty-seven states, as well as the 
District of Columbia, that leave the decision to sequester a jury 
entirely to the discretion of the trial judge.213  These states have 
no statutory restriction on the length of a separation of a jury at 
any phase of the trial.  A trial judge’s decision not to sequester a 
jury, or even in some cases to order sequestration over the 
defendant’s objection, is reviewable solely for an abuse of 
discretion.214  Eight additional states leave separation to the 
 
213 ALA R. CRIM. P. 19.3(a)(1)(1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-125(d)(1) (2017); 
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 27 (e)(2) (2017); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 19.4 (2017); CAL PENAL CODE 
§1121 (2018); COLO. CRIM. P. R.  24(f)(2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-246 (2018); D.C. 
SUP. CT. R. CRIM. P., 36-I (2017) (“The judge . . . may sequester the jury, or may take 
such other approved procedures as seem necessary to insure a fair trial in the 
case.”); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1214 (D.C. 1988) (“The decision to 
sequester a jury lies within the discretion of the trial judge.”); Claudio v. State, 585 
A.2d 1278, 1301 n.58 (Del. 1991) (“Delaware has adopted various rules and 
procedures which recognized the trial judge's discretionary right at common law to 
permit the jurors to eat and even to separate during the course of their 
deliberations.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-32 (2017); ME. R. UNIF. CRIM. P. 24(e) (2017); 
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 8-422 (2018); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 20(e)(3) (2018); MICH. CODE 
CRIM. P. § 768.16 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-501(1) (2017); State v. Smart, 
622 A.2d 1197, 1209 (N.H. 1993) (“Sequestration is an extreme measure, one of the 
most burdensome tools of the many available to assure a fair trial. Furthermore, the 
decision to grant a motion to sequester the jury is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and is not required simply because of media attention”) (internal 
citations omitted); State v. Martinez, 658 P.2d 428, 432 (N.M. 1983); State v. Griffin, 
866 P.2d 1156, 1162 (N.M. 1993) (refusal of court to sequester jury was not abuse of 
discretion); N.J., CT R. 1:8-6(b) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-1236(b) (2017); OR. R. 
CIV. P., 59(C)(6) (2018) (permitting a trial judge to “allow the jury to separate during 
its deliberations when the court is of the opinion that the deliberation process will 
not be adversely affected.”); see also, OR. REV. STAT. § 136.330(1) (2018) (making 
Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 59[C] applicable to criminal cases); PA. R. CRIM. P. 
642(A) (2018); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-13 (2017); UTAH CODE CRIM. P. 77-17-9(1) 
(2017); VT. R. CRIM. P. 23(d) (2018); VA. CODE CRIM. P. 19.2-264 (2018); WA. SUPR. 
CT. CRIM. R. 6.7 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-6 (2018); WIS. STAT. 972.12 (2017). 
214 See, e.g., Lam Luong v. State, 199 So. 3d 173, 188–89 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) 
(“[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to sequester the jury during trial is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court”) (quoting Belisle v. State, 11 So. 3d 256, 279 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2007)); Com. v. Clark, 730 N.E.2d 872, 882 (Ma. 2000) (“The 
decision whether to sequester a jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
judge.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cordle, 587 N.E.2d 1372, 1377 (Ma. 1992)). 
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judge’s discretion, but their statutes contain some restriction on 
the circumstances under which a separation can be granted.  
Specifically, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, and 
Wyoming all allow a deliberating jury to separate “overnight.”215  
Illinois and Iowa permit a deliberating jury to separate 
overnight, on weekends, and in cases of emergency.216  South 
Dakota allows separation until the next meeting of the court, but 
there is no definition of that term to clarify whether that is the 
next day the court is open for business or the date that the case is 
next scheduled.217   
Eight states, namely, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee, mandate 
sequestration during deliberations in death penalty cases.218  
However, Florida has express statutory authority for a trial judge 
to separate a deliberating jury in emergency situations and also 
permits sequestration to be waived if both the prosecution and 
defense consent.  Ohio also permits separation of a capital jury 
when emergencies arise. 
Only six states—Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas—mandate sequestration once 
deliberations begin in all criminal cases.219  Texas mandates 
sequestration when it is requested by either party or the court on 
its own motion determines it to be appropriate.  Kentucky 
mandates sequestration when deliberations begin unless the 
parties consent.  The remaining four states do not have express 
statutory authority permitting a judge to dispense with 
sequestration once deliberations begin.220 
 
215 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3420(a) (2018); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03(5)(3) (2018); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.391 (2017); S.C. R. CRIM. P. 23 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
11-207 (2018). 
216 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 436(a) (2017); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.927(c) (2017); see also IOWA 
R. CRIM. P. 2.19(5)(c) (2017). 
217 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 23A-24-4 (2017). 
218 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.370(c) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-142(a) (2017); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-2126 (2017); IND. CODE § 35-37-2-4(b) (2017). But see Johnson v. Indiana, 
749 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind. 2001) (holding that in capital cases, trial court must 
sequester jury upon request of the defendant). MISS. R. CRIM. P. 18.8 (2016); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 494.495 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.33 (2017); OHIO R. CRIM. 
P. 24(h)(3) (2017) (authorizing separation of capital jury in cases of emergency); 
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-18-116 (2017). 
219 KY. R. CRIM. P. § 9.66 (2017); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 791 (2017); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 29-2022 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-22-02 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 857 
(2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.23 (West 2017). 
220 Although trial judges in these six states do not have discretion to dispense 
with jury sequestration during deliberations, information provided to prospective 
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States deal with claims of error associated with jury 
sequestration in different ways.  Those that entrust 
sequestration to the discretion of the trial court will review 
decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.221  Claims of 
error can include that the trial court improperly ordered 
sequestration,222 or that the failure to sequester a jury deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial in light of significant publicity on the 
subject matter of the trial.223   
Indiana, which mandates sequestration in capital cases 
where the prosecution seeks the death penalty,224 seems to have 
the strictest approach.  Denial of a defendant’s request to 
sequester the jury is reversible error.225  However, Indiana case 
law supports the proposition that separation of a deliberating 
jury in the case of an emergency is not, standing alone, a basis 
for reversal.226 
 
 
jurors in five of these states suggests that sequestration is a relatively rare 
occurrence. See, e.g., You, The Jury, Juror Handbook, COMMONWEALTH OF 
KENTUCKY COURT OF JUSTICE, 11 (Nov. 2017), https://courts.ky.gov/resources/public 
ationsresources/Publications/P7YoutheJury.pdf (“Occasionally, a judge will find it 
necessary to sequester a jury, which requires keeping a jury overnight.”); North 
Dakota Juror’s Handbook, NDCOURTS.GOV, available at http://www.nd 
courts.gov/Court/juror.htm (last visited November 18, 2018) (noting that “it is rare in 
North Dakota” for a jury to stay overnight); Jury Commission, ORLEANS CRIMINAL 
DISTRICT COURT, http://www.criminalcourt.org/jury-commission (last visited 
November 18, 2018) (noting that in Louisiana, “the only time one may be 
sequestered while serving on a jury is on a 1st degree murder case”); Jury Service, 
NEBRASKA JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/programs-
services/jury-service (last visited November 18, 2018) (noting that “occasionally, it 
becomes necessary to keep a jury overnight . . . .”); Jury Selection and Trial Process, 
DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS, https://dentoncounty.com/Departments/District-
Clerk/Jury-Services/Jury-Selection-Trial-Process.aspx (last visited November 18, 
2018) (“Sequestered juries are very rare . . . .”). 
221 See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854, 868 (Cal. 1988); Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 730 N.E.2d 872, 882 (Mass. 2000). 
222 See People v. McCoy, 939 N.E. 2d 950, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“extremely 
brief deliberations after a reference to sequestration may invite an inference that the 
reference coerced the jury to render its verdict”) (internal citations omitted). 
223 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966) (finding failure to 
sequester jury or take additional precautions in light of the publicity surrounding 
the case deprived defendant of a fair trial). 
224 The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, Indiana Death Penalty Laws, 
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/dplaw.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
225 Lowery v. Indiana, 434 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ind. 1982); see also Johnson v. 
Indiana, 749 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind. 2001). 
226 Smith v. Indiana, 170 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ind. 1960). 
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Florida also requires per se reversal for sequestration 
violations, but has express statutory authorization permitting 
separations of juries in cases of necessity.227  Although Ohio 
permits separation of a deliberating jury in capital cases in an 
emergency, the standard of review applied for alleged 
sequestration violations depends on the nature of the violation 
and whether the issue was preserved in the trial court.228 
The remaining states that mandate sequestration at some 
point in the case, either in all cases or only in capital cases, 
analyze claimed sequestration violations in two ways: 
(1) Kentucky, North Dakota, Mississippi, Missouri, and 
Tennessee require a defendant to show prejudice before a 
conviction will be reversed;229 (2) Louisiana, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, Georgia, Texas, and Idaho presume prejudice but 
permit the prosecution to rebut the presumption.230  In all of 
 
227 Campbell v. Florida, 2 So. 3d 291, 294 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (“Unless the 
record discloses an exceptional circumstance of emergency, accident or other special 
necessity, or unless the parties have formally waived the requirement of 
sequestration on the record, the trial judge has no discretion to deny sequestration, 
and the failure to sequester deliberating jurors in a capital case is prejudicial 
error.”). 
228 Ohio v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 345 (Oh. 1956) (declining to “presume a 
prejudice as a matter of law from the fact that some of the jurors made telephone 
calls to members of their immediate families”). 
229 See Gabow v. Kentucky, 34 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Ky. 2000) (“The general rule is 
that a mere temporary separation of the jury is not grounds for reversal if it appears 
that no definite prejudice resulted and there was no opportunity to tamper with the 
jurors.”); North Dakota v. Weisz, 654 N.W.2d 416, 419 (N.D. 2002) (requiring a 
showing of actual prejudice for sequestration violations and declining to adopt 
Nebraska’s “rebuttable presumption of prejudice” approach); Simmons v. State, 805 
So. 2d 452, 506 (Miss. 2001); Missouri v. Clay, 812 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Mo. 1991); 
Gonzales v. Tennessee, 593 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tn. 1980) (reaffirming requirement 
that an improper “separation may be explained by the prosecution, showing that the 
juror had no communication with other persons, or that such communication was 
upon subjects foreign to the trial, and that, in fact, no impressions other than those 
drawn from the testimony, were made upon his mind . . . .”) (quoting Hines v. 
Tennessee, 27. Tenn. 597, 602 (1848)). 
230 Louisiana v. Jones, 794 So. 2d 107, 120 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (“[U]pon a 
separation . . . a presumption of misconduct arises and reversible error will be 
presumed. [However, where] circumstances are such as to reasonably overcome the 
presumption of prejudice and where it affirmatively appears that no prejudice to the 
accused could have resulted, the presumption may be rebutted . . . .”); Nebraska v. 
Foster, 839 N.W.2d 783, 806 (Neb. 2013) (Failure to sequester a juror “creates a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice; and places the burden upon the prosecution to 
show that no injury resulted.”) (internal citations omitted); Johnson v. Oklahoma, 93 
P.3d 41, 47 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (“[W]hen a violation of [the sequestration] 
statute occurs over defense objection prejudice is presumed and the burden falls to 
the State to prove otherwise.”); Legare v. Georgia, 257 S.E.2d 247, 253 (Ga. 1979) 
(“[T]here arises a legal presumption that the defendant has been injured [by the 
2018] NEW YORK’S 24-HOUR JURY DELIBERATION RULE 227 
these jurisdictions, a mistrial is never warranted, absent 
prejudice to the defendant, when the separation is caused by 
some emergency.  New York’s statute should be similarly 
construed. 
VI. THE CASE FOR AMENDMENT 
Although case law in New York supports the notion that an 
unplanned separation of deliberating jurors does not warrant a 
mistrial or reversal on appeal absent a showing of prejudice by 
the defendant,231 the Legislature should nevertheless amend CPL 
§ 310.10(2).  The statute, on its face, grants no discretion to trial 
courts to extend a recess in deliberations beyond the time 
specified in the statute and such courts are understandably 
reluctant to act in contravention of the statute’s plain language. 
Efforts have been made to amend CPL § 310.10(2) to permit 
judges, when appropriate, to adjourn deliberations for more than 
24 hours.  In 2016, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and 
Procedure issued a report recommending the amendment of CPL 
§ 310.10 to permit separation of jurors for a longer period of 
time.232  The proposed law “retain[ed] the twenty-four hour limit 
in most cases, but provid[ed], ‘upon good cause shown, an 
additional period not to exceed 48 hours.’ ”233  The Committee 
considered, but ultimately rejected, removing the time restraint 
altogether.  The latest proposal, which was introduced in the 
New York State Assembly in 2017, authorized a separation for up 
to 72 hours.  That proposal passed the Assembly on June 21, 
2017, but on January 3, 2018, the Senate returned the bill to the 
Assembly without taking any action on it.  The Assembly again 
passed the bill, but the Senate again took no action.234 
Each attempt to amend the law has dealt solely with 
extending the acceptable length of any recess in deliberations 
without conferring any general authority on judges to recess 
deliberations when unforeseen circumstances arise that prevent 
 
improper separation of a jury] and it is incumbent upon the state to have rebutted 
that legal presumption . . . .”); Idaho v. Rodriguez, 460 P.2d 711, 714 (Idaho 1969); 
Harris v. State, 738 S.W. 2d 207, 222 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1987). 
231 See supra notes 207–09. 
232 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE TO 
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 22 
(2016). 
233 Id. 
234 For a complete history and text of this bill, see http://nyassembly.gov/leg/ 
?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A07448&term=2017 (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
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a deliberating juror from returning to court within the statutorily 
required time period.  Accordingly, CPL § 310.10(2) should be 
amended as follows: 
At any time after the jury has been charged or commenced its 
deliberations, and after notice to the parties and affording such 
parties an opportunity to be heard on the record outside of the 
presence of the jury, the court may declare the deliberations to 
be in recess and may thereupon direct the jury to suspend its 
deliberations and to separate for a reasonable period of time to 
be specified by the court not to exceed forty-eight hours.  
However, in the case of a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, or an 
unforeseen circumstance that makes it impractical to resume 
deliberations, such separation may extend beyond such forty-
eight hour period.  Before each recess, the court must admonish 
the jury as provided in § 270.40 of this chapter and direct it not 
to resume its deliberations until all twelve jurors have 
reassembled in the designated place at the termination of the 
declared recess. 
The amendment would have several benefits.  It would afford 
the approximately two-thirds of all trial judges in New York 
County Supreme Court who are designated as calendar judges 
one full day per week to handle the other cases pending before 
them.235  That means that on the same day each week, a trial 
judge who is also a calendar judge would be able to preside over 
about fifty additional cases that are scheduled either for 
arraignment, for decision on a pre-trial motion, or for a guilty 
plea.  Although it is not possible for a calendar judge to preside 
over the trial of every case pending before her, it is possible and 
strongly preferable to have the same judge preside over the case 
from arraignment to the start of the trial.  A judge who presides 
over all pre-trial aspects of the case is naturally going to be 
better informed about the facts and circumstances of it, and thus 
be able to make far more informed decisions. 
An alternative solution, namely assigning all pending cases 
to a handful of calendar judges to determine all pre-trial matters, 
thereby freeing up the remaining judges to handle only trials, is 
untenable.  In New York County alone, there were 6,538 
indictments filed in 2016.236  Although this alternative solution 
would allow trial judges to try cases to verdict without 
interrupting jury deliberations for a calendar day, the resulting 
 
235 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
236 STATE OF OUR JUDICIARY 2017: EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE YEAR ONE 10 (2017). 
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caseloads of the calendar judges would be unmanageable, making 
it difficult, if not impossible, for these judges to make informed 
decisions on these cases. 
In addition to affording judges the express authority to 
recess deliberations to accommodate a calendar day, the proposed 
amendment would serve to dispel any doubt that judges have 
discretion to adjourn deliberations in the event that a juror does 
return to court.  Delegating the length of an adjournment to the 
sound discretion of a trial judge in these unique and limited 
circumstances would not open the door to abuse or encourage 
deliberations to be unnecessarily extended because of lengthy 
recesses.  Judges make decisions of equal or greater magnitude 
in their day-to-day responsibilities of presiding over criminal 
trials.  There is no reason why the Legislature should not give 
them express—but limited—authority to handle a far more basic 
concern, namely the scheduling of jury deliberations.  As with so 
many other judicial determinations made in the heat of trial, this 
one will be reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. 
Creating express statutory authority for a judge to extend a 
recess in deliberations under very limited circumstances also 
would not cause unnecessary delays of trials.  Trial judges are 
under significant pressure to expeditiously resolve cases so that 
other matters can be sent to them for trial.  In New York County, 
court personnel, referred to as “expediters,” continuously check 
the status of all trials to ensure that the cases are moving 
expeditiously and that judges who have recently resolved a 
case—through plea or trial—are quickly assigned another case to 
preside over.237  Further, the New York State Unified Court 
System is committed to decreasing the time it takes to resolve 
criminal cases.  This “Excellence Initiative,” involves “a top-to-
bottom examination of court operations focused on improving the 
courts’ ability to ensure the just and timely resolution of all 
matters that come before them—our core obligation as the 
judicial branch of government.”238  The report of this initiative 
sets out detailed changes in the court system to ensure that cases 
are more expediently brought to a resolution.  In light of this 
commitment, it would be difficult for anyone to argue that trial 
judges, even with unfettered discretion, would recess 
deliberations unnecessarily. 
 
237 NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ 
1jd/criminal/department.shtml#Case. 
238 Id. 
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Trial judges also have a responsibility to the sworn jurors to 
keep the case on schedule and to avoid unnecessary delay.239  
Before jury selection begins, the panel of prospective jurors is 
informed of the anticipated length of the trial.  This allows the 
trial judge to excuse potential jurors who are unable to serve 
because of some legitimate scheduling concern.  Recessing 
deliberations, or any other part of the trial unnecessarily, risks 
extending the case beyond the time in which the sworn jurors are 
available to serve.  And if the trial is unnecessarily extended to a 
day in which one or more sworn jurors is no longer available, a 
mistrial may be required.240 
In sum, depriving judges of express statutory authority to 
extend recesses in deliberations beyond 24 hours is an 
unnecessary and unworkable restraint on judicial discretion.  
Such a restraint does not ensure the integrity of deliberations, 
nor does it make it any less likely that jurors will engage in some 
form of misconduct or that others may attempt to influence them.  
This was conclusively demonstrated when the Office of Court 
Administration began collecting data when CPL § 310.10(2) was 
enacted in 1995 to permit jury separation in trials of certain 
lower level felonies.241  The data included 935 cases where the 
jurors were permitted to separate.  “[I]n no case were allegations 
raised that jurors were intimidated, tampered with or improperly 
contacted during separation.”242 
Further, the most important factor in assuring that a jury 
remains fair and impartial is the jury selection process.  During 
that process, the parties select jurors who can not only fairly 
evaluate the evidence, but who can also follow the trial judge’s 
instructions.  Those instructions include not speaking to anyone 
about the trial, not doing any research about the case or the 
parties, and not going on the internet or social media to attempt 
to learn more about the case.243  To posit that a recess that 
 
239 See NYS UNITED COURT SYSTEM PETIT JUROR’S HANDBOOK, available at 
http://www.nyjuror.gov/pdfs/hb_Petit.pdf (“We are keenly aware that New Yorkers 
have busy lives and that you have many demands on your time. Knowing that, we 
have transformed the jury system, by increasing the jury pool and reducing the 
length of jury service . . . .”). 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 51–53. 
241 HON. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, SEPARATION AND SEQUESTRATION OF 
DELIBERATING JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 5 (1999).  
242 Id. at 12. 
243 Jury Admonitions in Preliminary Instructions, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Jury_Admonitions.pdf. 
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extends beyond the next business day would have any effect on 
jurors who have survived the selection process undermines the 
value of that process and the seriousness that sworn jurors place 
on their responsibility to decide a criminal case.  It is a well-
settled principle that trial jurors are presumed to follow a judge’s 
instructions.244  The same confidence that the system places in 
jurors abiding by a trial judge’s admonitions during all recesses 
in the trial, should similarly be placed in their ability to abide by 
those instructions during an unexpected but limited extension of 
a particular recess. 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing defendants to move for and obtain mistrials based 
upon a delay in resuming jury deliberations does nothing to 
render the process fairer or to protect any right of a defendant.  
Granting these applications in the absence of prejudice to a 
defendant wastes scarce and valuable judicial resources, requires 
the state to unnecessarily retry a case, and makes witnesses 
again take time from their lives to testify in court.  Indeed, in 
many cases, a defendant is afforded a tactical advantage by 
forcing the state to retry the case.  There are of course occasions 
when the law accepts conferring a tactical advantage on a 
defendant as “a tolerable side effect of the protection of 
defendants’ most basic rights,”245 but there is no right of a 
defendant that is affected when a jury deliberation recess is 
extended beyond the period specified in CPL § 310.10(2). 
 
244 People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266, 274, 926 N.E.2d 240, 245, 899 N.Y.S.2d 733, 
738 (2010). 
245 People v. Rivera, 23 N.Y.3d 827, 838, 18 N.E.3d 367, 375, 993 N.Y.S.2d 656, 
664 (2014) (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting). 
